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I. INTRODUCTION
Dear Sammy,
Our life together was a financial success, but an artistic
failure.' -Our marriage is over.
Regards,
Becky
my
cc: ou* lawyer
Whether Becky has grounds for divorce is hardly at issue
under the typical no-fault divorce statute.2 Becky's terse episto-
lary farewell omits reference to the subjects of dispute that will
soon dominate their new relationship as a divorced couple: the
family business; the home; the furniture; and other investments,
most of which are not easily divisible. The last thing they are
thinking of is the implications of their financial arrangements or
their present and future tax liability. As they travel along the
path of divorce, the problems that will assail them include the
laws governing the taxation of the divorce settlement. The ques-
tion for Becky, Sammy, and their respective advisors is how to
unscramble the assets of the marriage in a way that will lead to
a fair division after the tax burdens are imposed. The basic
problem in achieving this end is that the price tag of the split-up
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versity. The author wishes to particularly thank Mr. Leo Kornfeld, Editor, for permis-
sion to reprint portions of this article which also appeared in Vol. 10, No. 4 of the COM-
MuNrry PROPERTY JOURNAL. The author would also like to thank Professor Charles
Sullivan for reading and commenting on this article. The author also acknowledges the
valuable research assistance of Anthony Henika.
1. Cf. Bernatschke v. United States, 364 F.2d 400, 405 (Ct. Cl. 1966) (wife's singing
concerts "were artistic successes rather than profitable ventures").
2. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 4506 (West 1983); WASH. REv. CODE § 26.09.030 (1983).
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is uncertain because the incidence of income tax on the division
of the marital assets under current law is unpredictable.3 The
inevitable result is that many separation agreements, which the
parties think will settle the financial responsibilities fairly, have
unwanted tax consequences.
The purpose of this article is to consider the tax conse-
quences of divorce, particularly those problems relating to prop-
erty settlements. The tax consequences of alimony and child
support are also considered. These problems have a long history
that must be reviewed in order to understand both the present
law and the current proposals4 which were considered by the
House Ways and Means Committee during the last session of
Congress. Unfortunately, the narrowness of the legislative pro-
posals permits many of the problems to continue; the proposals
change only the timing of the problem.
II. PROPERTY DIVISION
A. No Direct Election Under Current Law
The act of "splitting the sheets," under current law, may
have any one of three disparate results: nontaxable division of
assets,5 recognition of gain or loss,' or includible7/deductible' ali-
mony. Becky and Sammy may come to learn that determining
the holder of legal title to property, by either contract wording
or presumptions of state law, has more importance in establish-
ing respective tax burdens than either their agreement or the
divorce court decree. Will there be a cost at all? If so, to whom?
Ultimately, geography governs in determining whether a divorc-
ing couple's tax liabilities remain unchanged in the wake of
divorce or whether they have each made money, lost it, or
received a deduction.9
Under current law, divisions of co-owned property are non-
3. The current rules are often litigated and often prove "a trap for the unwary."
H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 191 (1983).
4. H.R. 4170, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). See infra note 87.
5. See Carrieres v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 959, 963 (1975) affd per curiam, 552 F.2d
1350 (9th Cir. 1977), acq., 1976-2 C.B. 1; Wren v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 290
(1965); Davenport v. Commissioner, 12 T.C.M. 856 (1953); Walz v. Commissioner, 32
B.T.A. 718 (1935).
6. Davis v. United States, 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
7. I.R.C. § 71(a)(1) (1982).
8. I.R.C. § 215 (1982); see Watkins v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 349 (1969).
9. See generally Davis, 370 U.S. at 71; Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
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taxable. 10 Divisions of separate property are taxable.11 State law
often provides a presumption of either separate property or co-
ownership of property, but that presumption can be varied by
contract." Hence, residents of community property states can
elect separate property status resulting in taxable transfers in
connection with divorce, and residents of common-law states can
elect joint ownership resulting in nontaxable divorce settle-
ments. Thus, if a couple wants a taxable or nontaxable division
of property to occur upon divorce, fulfillment of their dream
merely requires early planning. For most married taxpayers, tax
planning is not done until the divorce; at that time, the tax con-
sequences of property divisions are obscure but final. The need
for certainty as to the tax cost of the division is acute. Without
this figure, one cannot calculate the value of a property settle-
ment. Yet, the tax law prohibits a direct election of tax conse-
quences by the divorcing couple. To have the chosen tax conse-
quences, the election must not be connected to the divorce.'"
Although antithetic to true romance, the best divorce for
tax purposes is the one that is premeditated and, preferably, one
that is is planned from the first date. However, even the divorce
that is planned on the courthouse steps can afford the partici-
pants some options for tax consequences. One example is the
selection of taxable (alimony) or nontaxable (child support) sup-
port payments. Despite whatever current law allows the parties
10. See Rev. Rul. 81-292, 1981-2 C.B. 158 (division of jointly held property in com-
mon law state); Rev. Rul. 76-83, 1976-1 C.B. 213 (division of community property).
11. Davis, 370 U.S. 65. A transfer made pursuant to a property division is neither
income to the recipient nor deductible by the transferor. Lambros v. Commissioner, 459
F.2d 69, 71 (6th Cir. 1972); Houston v. Commissioner, 442 F.2d 40, 41 (7th Cir. 1971);
Campbell v. Lake, 220 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1955); Smith's Estate v. Commissioner, 208
F.2d 349, 351 (3d Cir. 1953); Mills v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 608. 618 (1970) aff'd, 442
F.2d 1149 (10th Cir. 1971); Thompson v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 522, 525 (1968).
12. See, e.g., LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2328 (West Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE §
26.16.120 (1983); but see Jones v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 1416 (1982) (contract
that future earnings are separate property of earner spouse invalid under Texas law).
13. It is arguable, for example, that the transfer of property by gift between spouses
shortly before commencement of an action for divorce may be treated as a transfer in
exchange for marital rights. In such a case, the original transfer and the divorce are as
closely connected as any two steps in the divorce process for purposes of the step-trans-
action doctrine. The step-transaction doctrine is used by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue to attack the tax consequences of a transaction. Combining a single transfer of
property with other transactions (steps) into a single integrated transaction will produce
a different tax result. See B. BiTTKER & J. EUSTACE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF COR-
PORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, 1.05 (1971). The step-transaction doctrine has not been
used to challenge property divisions incident to divorce. See generally Helvering v. Elk-
horn Coal Co., 95 F.2d 732 (4th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 605 (1938).
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to plan by agreement, tax consequences cannot be specifically
elected as such. Such consequences are effects of other unrelated
substantive transactions. The choice offered is not between taxa-
ble and nontaxable payments, but between alimony 14 and child
support,15 or alimony and property settlement."6 Becky, who
wants a payment to be nontaxable, cannot say so directly. She
must style the agreement as child support.1" On a government
challenge to the agreement, the court may find the desired child
support payment was, in fact, alimony. 8 The court's decision
will produce tax consequences exactly contrary to the careful
plans of the divorced couple, by changing a nontaxable and non-
deductible payment into a taxable and deductible one. This is so
because the question is not whether the payment was intended
to be taxable or nontaxable, but whether it is properly termed
child support or alimony in law. 9
B. No Safe Harbor
How do you split the pie, if no child is involved? Sammy
and Becky will soon learn that property transfers do not provide
a safe harbor.2 0 Assume their only property is 100 shares of stock
with a basis of $100 and a fair market value of $1,000, which
were held for investment for more than a year.2 The stock has a
potential gain of $900. Sammy and Becky desire a 50-50 split of
property owned at the time of divorce. Becky does not want ali-
14. I.R.C. § 71(a) (1982).
15. I.R.C. § 71(b) (1982).
16. See Mills v. Commissioner, 442 F.2d 1149 (10th Cir. 1971); Bernatschke v.
United States, 364 F.2d 400 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Schatz v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH)
292, 296 (1981); Ryker v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 924, 929 (1960). The provisions of sec-
tion 71 apply to payments made "in recognition of the general obligation to support."
Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(4) (1960). Hence payments not in the nature of support, such as
property divisions, are not regulated under the alimony section. See H.R. RFP. No. 2333,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 83-85 (1942).
17. See Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299 (1961); Blakey v. Commissioner, 78
T.C. 963 (1982).
18. Gilbertson v. Commissioner, 10 T.C.M. (CCH) 594 (1951).
19. See Beard v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1275 (1981); Jackson v. Commissioner, 54
T.C. 125, 130 (1970); Harris v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 980 (1969) (payments character-
ized as alimony in decree taxed as child support); Joslin v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 231,
236 (1969), aff'd, 424 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1970).
20. Schatz v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 292, 296 n.10 (1981).
21. The examples used herein assume that the property sold or divided is eligible
for capital gains treatment. Such treatment depends on the character of the property
transferred. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1221 (1982) (assets held for investment receive capital
gains treatment); see also infra note 150.
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mony. Sammy has title to the stock which was acquired during
the marriage.
Sammy and Becky have two options: either sell the property
and divide the cash proceeds, or divide the property itself. Sell-
ing the stock avoids untoward division of the tax burden, but at
the cost of immediate recognition of gain. If the stock is commu-
nity property and it is sold,22 the divorced couple share equally
the tax burden ($90 each) and the net proceeds ($410 each) 2 3 If
it is separate property, Sammy's tax burden is technically
increased to $180, but the after-tax distribution still nets each
party $410. Therefore, title affects the tax burden but not the
amount of ultimate proceeds to be divided. Can the obvious
defect, the immediate recognition of tax consequences, be
deferred without compromising equal division?
The answer is yes if Sammy's stock is community property.
Sammy and Becky can each take 50 shares with a basis of $50.
One-half the community basis is allocated to each party.24
Assuming for the purpose of comparison that he and she both
immediately sell their shares for $500, the tax burden and the
proceeds are unchanged from the cash division above. Each pays
$90 in tax and nets $410.25 However, if Sammy's stock is sepa-
rate property, there is a substantial difference in the amount of
net proceeds shared by each party: with the entire tax burden of
$180 paid by Sammy, he nets only $320, while Becky nets
$500.6 In sum, in a common-law jurisdiction, an equal division
of separate property cannot both divide the tax burden fairly
and avoid the immediate recognition of gain.
Treatment of the transfer as alimony27 is a possible unin-
22. See I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(3) (1982) (gain from sale of property included in gross
income); 1001(a), (c) (recognition and computation of gain).
23. See infra p. 446, Table 1 Column A (community property or jointly held prop-
erty) and Column B (separate property).
24. See Wren v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 290 (1965). The basis of a divided
asset is the percentage of the asset received multiplied by the community's pre-divorce
basis in the asset. Rev. Rul. 76-83, 1976-1 C.B. 213; see also Carrieres v. Commissioner,
64 T.C. 959 (1975), afl'd per curiam, 552 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1977).
25. See Carson v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 818, 820 (1978); Harrah v. Com-
missioner, 70 T.C. 735, 748 (1978); Walz v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 718, 720 (1935).
26. See infra p. 446, Table 1, Column C. See also Davis, 370 U.S. at 73; Rev. Rul.
67-221, 1967-2 C.B. 63. The basis of Becky's property is the fair market value at the date
of transfer.
27. See Hayutin v. Commissioner, 508 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1974); Warnack v. Com-
missioner, 71 T.C. 541 (1979), acq., 1979-1 C.B. 1. But see Riddell v. Guggenheim, 281
F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1960) (payments for share of community property not alimony);
Goninen v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 737 (1983); Dorn v. Commissioner, 46
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common-law jurisdiction.2 9 Such treatment is most likely to
occur under an equitable apportionment statute which in a com-
mon-law jurisdiction3 0 permits judicial discretion in dividing
property owned by Sammy or permits an unequal division of
community property.3 1 Under such a statute, Becky's property
rights are difficult to evaluate.3 2 If she receives property based
on her need for support as well as her deemed contribution to
the family, Sammy may be able to convert the property settle-
ment into alimony" despite his agreement with Becky. Further-
more, this result may occur in a community property state in
two other ways. First, in the case where the value of Becky's
interest in the community is difficult to estimate, the agreed
amount of her interest for purposes of property settlement may
be disregarded in a future tax proceeding. If her pre-divorce
interest is found to be less than she in fact received in the
divorce settlement, the amount received in excess of the value of
her share of the community may be taxable as alimony" if it
meets the other requirements of section 71 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code ("I.R.C.")." Second, the same result may occur if the
couple elected during their marriage to own all their assets as
separate property. In that case, transfers from one spouse to the
other may be characterized as alimony. The result is to give
Sammy an effective windfall of $530, and leave Becky with only
$250 net proceeds. This is hardly the result that divorced
couples desire,3 6 but it is a quite possible result under current
29. See Wright v. Commissioner, 543 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1976); Bardwell v. Commis-
sioner, 318 F.2d 786 (10th Cir. 1963); Schottenstein v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 451 (1980),
acq., 1981-2 C.B. 2 (periodic payments of "property settlement" taxed as alimony).
30. See, e.g., N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney Supp. 1983-84); OHiO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3105.18 (Page 1980).
31. See, e.g., Taylor v. Campbell, 335 F.2d 841, 845-46 (5th Cir. 1964); TEx. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon Supp. 1982-83).
32. See Nathan v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 865 (1953).
33. Schottenstein v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 451, 463 (1981), acq., 1981-2 C.B. 2
(household and child care services do not aid in accretion to family wealth).
34. West v. United States, 332 F. Supp. 1102 (S.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd, 477 F.2d 563
(5th Cir. 1973); Furgatch v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1205 (1980).
35. I.R.C. § 71 (1982) provides that under a decree of divorce, separate maintenance,
or support, periodic payments made to a wife in discharge of the husband's legal obliga-
tion which exists because of the marital or family relationship are taxable as gross
income to the wife.
36. See Schottenstein, 75 T.C. at 460 (more than intent required); but cf. Phinney
v. Mauk, 411 F.2d 1196, 1198 (5th Cir. 1969) (intent of parties controls). See also infra p.
489, Chart 1.
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law. 7
III. PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS
A. The Search for Substance Over Form: The Role of State
Law
One reasonably would expect the divorce decree or separa-
tion agreement between the parties to determine the character
of the payment as either alimony or property settlement, and in
the latter case, to result in its being taxable or nontaxable. This
is not the case. It is settled federal tax doctrine that the inci-
dence of taxation does not depend on the mere form or labels"
given by the parties to the transaction, but on the substance 9 of
the transaction. For Sammy and Becky, the "substance" may
not be settled by either agreement or divorce decree, but in a
later tax proceeding in which the federal court may redetermine
the character of the transaction and its consequent tax burden.40
Where federal tax liability turns upon the character of a
state-created property interest,' 1 the Supreme Court has held
that "federal authorities are not bound by the determination
made of such property interest by a state trial court.' 2 In Com-
missioner v. Estate of Bosch,3 the ultimate outcome of a federal
estate tax liability controversy hinged on a determination under
state law of whether a widow's prior release of a general power
of appointment under a trust set up by her husband was valid or
invalid." If invalid, she would have retained a general power of
appointment over property included in her husband's estate.
The property would then qualify for the marital deduction
under the federal estate tax law, significantly reducing the tax
37. See Landa v. Commissioner, 211 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
38. Westbrook v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1357, 1368 (1980) (payment labeled "sup-
port" held property division). See Weiner v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 155 (1973); Broida v.
United States, 40 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 1 77-5189 (N.D. Ohio 1977); Jackson v. Commis-
sioner, 54 T.C. 125, 129-30 (1970).
39. Taylor v. Campbell, 335 F.2d 841, 845 (5th Cir. 1964). See Widmer v. Commis-
sioner, 75 T.C. 405 (1980); Newbury v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 690 (1966). Cf. Helvering
v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252, 255 (1939) (in the field of taxation "written
documents are not rigidly binding").
40. Wright v. Commissioner, 543 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1976). See Beard v. Commis-
sioner, 77 T.C. 1275 (1981).
41. Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 457 (1967).
42. 387 U.S. 456, 457 (1967).
43. 387 U.S. at 456.
44. Id. at 458.
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burden.45 During the pendency of the tax proceeding, a state
probate court held the release invalid.46
The Tax Court accepted the state court ruling and permit-
ted the deduction.' 7 The court of appeals affirmed.' 8 The issue
was whether a federal court, when deciding a federal tax contro-
versy, is bound by a lower state court determination of substan-
tive law, and more specifically, how the federal court shall find
state law when there is no decision on point by a state's highest
court.49 The Supreme Court held that a federal court deciding a
federal tax controversy is not bound by a lower state court opin-
ion when the state's highest court had not resolved the issue in
question.50 The Supreme Court determined that interpretations
of state property law by a state's highest court are binding on
federal courts under the Erie doctrine.5' The Court, stating that
it was applying Erie, held: "If there be no decision by that [the
state's highest] court then federal authorities must apply what
they find to be the state law after giving 'proper regard' to rele-
vant rulings of other courts of the State."52
Implicit in the Bosch holding, according to Justice Douglas'
dissent, is the belief that state proceedings "are brought solely
to avoid federal taxes." 53 The dissent pointed out that the
majority in Bosch did not require federal courts to determine
whether the state court divorce decree purported to be a "decla-
ration of state law," 5' or whether it was "merely a judicial stamp
placed upon the parties' contractual settlement." 55 The Supreme
Court also rejected the theory that "state trial court adjudica-
tions be binding when the judgment is the result of an adversary
proceeding in state court."56 It follows that a consent judgment,
even if the product of arm's-length negotiations, has no prece-
dential value as an exposition of local property law. A fortiori,
45. Id.
46. Id. at 459.
47. Bosch v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 43 T.C. 120, 124 (1964), affd, 363 F.2d 1009 (2d
Cir. 1966), rev'd, 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
48. 363 F.2d at 1015.
49. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. at 467 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 457.
51. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
52. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. at 465.
53. Id. at 470 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also id. at 465 (the majority was also
concerned about the bringing of state proceedings to avoid federal taxes).
54. Id. at 471 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 463.
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since most divorce decrees are based on separation agreements,57
such decrees are of no precedential value at all.
In construing the federal taxing statute in Bosch, the
Supreme Court looked exclusively to the legislative history sur-
rounding the statute.
[Tihe report of the Senate Finance Committee recommending
enactment of the marital deduction used very guarded lan-
guage in referring to the very question involved here. It said
that "proper regard," not finality, "should be given to interpre-
tations of the will" by state courts and then only when entered
by a court "in a bona fide adversary proceeding.""'
Noting that federal courts are not always bound to follow lower
and intermediate state appellate courts in diversity cases if the
federal court is persuaded that the state's highest court would
decide otherwise, the Court added, "[i]t follows here then, that
when the application of a federal statute is involved, the deci-
sion of a state trial court as to an underlying issue of state law
would a fortiori not be controlling."59
In a property settlement, the determination of whether
there was a taxable exchange or a nontaxable division of existing
property rights between co-owners is determined under state law
at the time of the transfer. The tax consequences of the transfer
are then determined by federal law. 0 Since the Commissioner is
not a party to the divorce, tax issues and the underlying prop-
erty issues are not stabilized by the doctrines of res judicata or
collateral estoppel. 61
Unlike the statute construed in Bosch, property settlements,
of course, have no legislative context. Although the legislative
history of federal alimony taxation indicates that state divorce
law is to be subordinated to a unified federal determination of
alimony, I.R.C. section 71" does not apply directly to property
settlements. Congress left the tax consequences of property set-
tlements dependent on rights created under state law. Determi-
nation of gain or loss on transfer is treated as an ordinary com-
57. See infra note 282.
58. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. at 464 (quoting S. REP. No. 1013, Pt. 2., 80th Cong.,
2d Sess. 4 (1948)).
59. Id. at 465.
60. See Forbes v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 840 (D. Mass. 1979).
61. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. at 463.
62. I.R.C. § 71 (1982). See supra note 36.
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mercial transaction. I.R.C. section 1001,63 which is not concerned
with the regulation of property settlements, but rather with the
calculation of gain in ordinary sales or exchanges of property,
provides no relevant history."' No other section is applicable
specifically to a property settlement incident to divorce.
The application of such reasoning consistent with Bosch to
the tax liability for divorce-related transfers causes tax planning
in divorce to be unduly complex. Neither the basis of the prop-
erty acquired in a property settlement, nor the fact that it is a
property settlement,65 as compared to alimony,66 is binding on
the federal court. It follows that neither the findings of the
divorce court nor the separation agreements determine the
future tax consequences to the parties. Of course, tax conse-
quences have a substantial effect on the real value of the settle-
ment.67 Even the simplest example has an uncertain answer
because of the complexity of tax law.'
B. Judicial Allocation of the Tax Burden-A Critique
The adversary model for the determination of tax conse-
quences of divorce allows the husband or wife to take a position
inconsistent with either a prior separation agreement between
the parties or with the court decree.6 9 The injustice caused by
post-divorce tax litigation is not the imposition of tax on one of
the parties, but the impact of an unforeseeable tax burden on a
bargained-for division of assets. In effect, one party to the
divorce can avoid his or her obligation under the agreement and
use the tax laws as an instrument of avoidance.
At issue is the allocation of the tax burden between two tax-
payers who agreed to allocate it in a particular way.70 One ex-
spouse can unilaterally change the agreement by changing a
63. I.R.C. § 1001 (1982).
64. Davis, 370 U.S. at 69.
65. Riley v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 768 (10th Cir. 1981); Bishop v. Commissioner,
55 T.C. 720 (1971).
66. Schatz v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 292 (1981); Hesse v. Commissioner,
60 T.C. 685 (1973), aff'd, 511 F.2d 1393 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 834 (1975).
67. See Newburger v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 457 (1974). See also Newman v. Com-
missioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 219 (1974) (wife's alimony reduced on the basis that it was
not taxable income).
68. Beard v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1275 (1981).
69. Bolza v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1138 (1981) (contingent payment held
property settlement); Stiles v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 107 (1981).
70. Cf. Newburger v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 457 (1974).
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nontaxable transfer to a taxable one,71 or by changing the basis
of transferred property. Changing the apportionment of tax
costs in a divorce property settlement often leaves one party
with a tax burden and with limited remedies against the party
who received a windfall. The singular remedy is the reopening of
divorce proceedings in state court, but only if this is permitted
under the applicable state law. 2 This result obtains even though
it is clear that the supposed tax consequences of the transaction
affected the total amount of the award of property.
One possible way to avoid this injustice is the approach
taken in Commissioner v. Danielson.73 In Danielson, the Third
Circuit refused to recharacterize allocations made between the
sales price of a business and a covenant not to compete which
was executed contemporaneously with the sale. Ordinarily, the
sale of a business would result in a capital gain to the seller and
would not be deductible to the buyer. However, as in the Dan-
ielson transaction, the covenant not to compete results in ordi-
nary income to the recipient and a deductible business expense
to the payor. The Danielson court believed that if it were to
restructure the form of the transaction to match its tax sub-
stance, the court would be permitting a unilateral reformation of
the contract. This reformation would result in unjust enrich-
ment to the reforming party who would be relieved of the tax
allocated to him in the contract.7 4 In Danielson, the explicit allo-
cation had "no independent basis in fact or arguable relation-
ship with business reality. '75 Nevertheless, the court upheld the
provision for tax purposes absent proof which would negate the
provision in a contract action between the parties. 8 Substance
over form was not a sufficient argument to alter the tax conse-
quences of a negotiated agreement. Restructuring by courts on
the ground of substance over form would encourage the parties
71. See Karageorgevitch v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 1003 (1979).
72. Graham v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 415 (1982). Monthly payments for "family"
support are taxed to wife despite retroactive amendment to divorce decree designating
payments as child support. State court retroactive orders designating child support as
alimony or vice versa are generally disregarded for tax purposes by the federal courts.
See Gordon v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 525, 530 (1978). Clerical errors corrected retroac-
tively are given effect for tax purposes. Id.
73. 378 F.2d 771 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 858 (1967). Cf. Schmitz v. Commis-
sioner, 51 T.C. 306 (1968), a/Pd, Throndson v. Commissioner, 457 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir.
1972).
74. Danielson, 378 F.2d at 775.
75. Id. at 777.
76. Id. at 775. See also Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
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to determine the purchase price based on the supposed tax con-
sequences of the transaction, but allow one party to later shift
the tax burden to the other in a tax proceeding." If the reason-
ing in Danielson was applied to divorce agreements, much of the
problem with current law would be eliminated.7" But the Dan-
ielson rule, as such, has not been applied to divorce
agreements. 79
C. Towards Divorce Tax Simplification
The uncertainty of divorce-related tax consequences has
lead to acute problems for the couple, the government, and the
court system. In the first six months of 1982, 481 of the cases
docketed in the Tax Court concerned divorce controversies.8 " A
response by the bar and the federal government was inevitable.
The Domestic Relations Tax Simplification Task Force of the
American Bar Association comprehensively studied the problem
and proposed solutions.8 " Some of their recommendations would
obviate the Bo.sch problem. The Task Force recommended that
parties to a divorce choose their "correlative tax consequences "82
by a written agreement incident to divorce. The agreement,
binding on the government and the parties to the divorce, would
preclude later judicial characterization of a payment as a non-
taxable property settlement or a taxable alimony payment.
Much of the injustice created by the Bosch case would thus be
solved by the simple expedient of a direct label. In the case of a
property division, the Task Force recommended that nonrecog-
nition of gain or loss be the general rule. The Task Force alter-
natively recommended that the recognition of gain or loss be
77. Danielson, 378 F.2d at 775.
78. See Harrah v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 735, 747 n.6 (1978) (taxpayer who negoti-
ated divorce settlement on the basis of assets belonging to community could not later
claim a step-up in basis as if separate assets were transferred).
79. See White v. United States, 550 F. Supp. 96, 100 (M.D. Ala. 1982) (followed
divorce court designation). But see Weiner v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 155, 159-60 (1973)
(Court refused to apply Danielson rule in case of apparent overreaching in negotiating
separation agreement).
80. American Bar Association's Domestic Relations Tax Simplification Task Force,
ABA Section of Taxation, The "Private Ordering" Concept in Proposals for Simplifica-
tion of Domestic Relations Tax Law 3 (Aug. 2, 1982) (hereinafter cited as The "Private
Ordering" Concept).
81. See American Bar Association's Domestic Relations Tax Simplification Task
Force, ABA Section of Taxation, Preliminary Specification for Simplification, Techni-
cal Memorandum (May 17, 1981) (hereinafter cited as Technical Memorandum).
82. Id. at 2.
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elective. As under current law, in lieu of agreement, the federal
tax liability would be determined by a federal standard, albeit a
considerably more simplified standard.8
Congress, having studied the Task Force recommendations,
is likely to pass a bill to reform the taxation incidental upon
divorce in the current or next session. Congress' proposed bill
would apply to marital property transfers84 which occur during a
viable marriage, and transfers incident to divorce. 5 Current law
would continue to apply to premarital transfers. The bill, origi-
nally introduced in June 1983, was amended and combined with
other tax legislation, and reported favorably by the House Ways
and Means Committee8 7 on October 20, 1983. Under the bill,
parties may agree that a payment, which would otherwise qual-
ify as alimony, would neither be included in the gross income of
the recipient, nor be deductible to the payor8 Unlike the Task
Force proposal, neither child support nor property settlements
under Congress' bill can be designated as alimony (includible-
deductible) by agreement. Furthermore, under Congress' bill the
recognition or nonrecognition of gain or loss and, therefore, the
tax consequences of property settlement, cannot be altered by
agreement. The private ordering concept incorporated in Con-
gress' bill does not offer the flexibility of the Task Force propo-
sal. No purpose is apparently served by denying the parties to
divorce the right to agree to the apportionment of the tax bur-
den as well as the other economic consequences of their marital
dissolution. Failure to agree does not affect the parties to an
equal degree.
83. Id. at 11. See id. at app. III.
84. See H.R. 4170, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 422 (1983) (adds I.R.C. § 1041(a)(1)).
85. Id.
86. H.R. 3475, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). The provisions concerning divorce were
amended and combined with more controversial measures concerning industrial develop-
ment bonds.
87. H.R. 4170, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). On November 17, 1983, the House voted
to defeat the rule on H.R. 4170. Thus the bill was not brought to the floor prior to
adjournment for the year. It is expected that the bill will be reconsidered during the
second session of the 98th Congress. 70 TAXEs ON PARADE (CCH), No. 33, pt. 1 at 1 (Nov.
22, 1983).
88. H.R. 4170, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (§ 423 adds I.R.C. § 71(b)(1)(B)).
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IV. THE THREE-WAY CONFLICT AMONG THE SUBSTANTIVE
ISSUES OF FEDERAL TAX LAW, STATE PROPERTY LAW, AND STATE
DIVORCE LAWS
A. The Davis Rule
Property settlement is further complicated under current
law because of substantive problems relating to state law
presented by the Davis case. In 1962, the Supreme Court, in
United States v. Davis,9 held that the husband's transfer of
appreciated stock to his wife in settlement of her statutory
claim" to his property in a common-law state was a taxable
event. Mr. Davis was taxed as if he had sold the stock for cash
and used the cash to pay off his wife's claim. The market value
of the property transferred became Mrs. Davis' basis in the
property received.9 1 Under government practice, the exchange of
property settlement of marital rights was not treated as a taxa-
ble event for the wife. 92 Since the property transferred was
appreciated stock, Davis realized taxable gain to the extent of
the "excess of the amount realized over the adjusted basis."'
The "amount realized" is defined as the "sum of any money
received plus the fair market value of the property received.""4
The "property" received by Davis was his wife's inchoate mari-
tal rights (similar to dower) which attached on divorce or
death."' The value of those rights was determined under rules
governing ordinary arm's-length commercial transactions. In
such a case, the two sides of the bargain are presumed equal."
The Court found that the wife's right to a portion of the couple's
accumulated property did not vest until the death of her hus-
band or divorce. Therefore, the Court did not find that such an
interest was equivalent to the co-ownership of spouses in com-
munity property states. In a community property state, such an
interest vests from its acquisition.' 7 One may well look to com-
89. 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
90. See id. at 72.
91. Davis, 370 U.S. at 73 n.7.
92. Rev. Rul. 67-221, 1967-2 C.B. 63.
93. Davis, 370 U.S. at 72.
94. I.R.C. § 1001(b) (1982).
95. Davis, 370 U.S. at 70.
96. See Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184, 189
(Ct. Cl. 1954); Davis, 370 U.S. at 72.
97. For example, property with a community basis of $15,000 is divided 60/40. The
basis of the property received will be apportioned as follows: $9,000 ($15,000 x 60%) and
19841
456 University of Puget Sound Law Review
munity property as the solution to the tax problems of dividing
assets upon divorce. But even in a community property state,
the economics of the split do not determine whether it is equal
for tax purposes.
A property division in a community property state is usually
a formal recognition of a right that was vested in the recipient
spouse prior to the formal division.98 Thus, the transfer of prop-
erty from community ownership to separate ownership by the
husband and the wife is nontaxable so long as the division is of
equal value.9 9 The same result occurs in divisions of jointly held
property in common-law states. Unlike Davis, where the transfer
of title was also a transfer of substantive rights of ownership,
under community property law the transfer of the stock is
merely formal changing of title: the wife owns one-half of the
stock before and after the transfer. 00 Commonly, however, com-
munity property consists of a single or dominant asset that can-
not be divided easily, such as a dwelling.'0 1
Further, the fact that each party to a property settlement
receives an equal amount of property does not necessarily ensure
a tax-free division.102 The exchange of an interest in community
property for an equal amount of separate property will result in
a taxable transaction, in whole or in part. 03 The amount of gain
recognized is affected by the proportion of community property
received.104 If no community property is received, then the real-
ized gain equals one-half of the fair market value of the asset at
the date of transfer, less one-half of the community's pre-divorce
$6,000 ($15,000 x 40%). The basis remains unchanged. Rev. Rul. 76-83, 1976-1 C.B. 213.
See Wren v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 290 (1965).
98. See Rev. Rul. 56-437, 1956-2 C.B. 507.
99. Carson v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 818 (1978) (mathematical certainty is
not required in nontaxable divisions: 46.2/53.8 split of community property not taxable);
Harrah v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 187 (1982); Walz v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A.
718 (1935). See also Rev. Rul. 81-292, 1981-2 C.B. 158 (division of jointly held property
in common-law state is not a taxable event).
100. State statutes do not require an in-kind equal division of community property.
See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800 (West 1983).
101. See Carrieres v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 959 (1975) (community owned busi-
ness). Virgil M. Everhart of Central City, Kentucky, literally chopping his house in half
to give his wife an "equal property settlement," was stopped by judicial action. N.Y.
Times, Jan. 21, 1983, at A 10, col. 4.
102. Carrieres, 64 T.C. 959 (1975).
103. But see Rev. Rul. 76-83, 1976-1 C.B. 213 ($516 of separate property exchanged
in a $300,000 division held not taxable).
104. Carrieres, 64 T.C. at 964.
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basis in the asset. 08 Where Sammy receives the dominant com-
munity asset and gives separate property solely in exchange to
compensate Becky for her interest in the community property, 06
a Davis gain will result.10 7 For example, if Sammy receives all of
the community property valued at $100, with a basis of $50, and
Becky receives Sammy's separate property valued at $50 (equal
to her one-half interest in the community property), Becky will
be treated as if she had sold her community interest. 08 Becky's
realized gain is $25. Sammy acquires a partial step-up in basis
equal to one-half the fair market value of the asset. 09 Sammy's
basis in the former community property asset is now $75 (one-
half of the community basis ($25) plus one-half the fair market
value of the asset at date of transfer ($50)).110
B. Application of the Davis Rule to Community Property
States
1. Both Community and Separate Property Are Exchanged
If both community and separate property are exchanged,
then a hybrid rule results. Sammy and Becky own 100 shares of
a family corporation (fair market value $100, basis $40), and $30
in a community checking account. Becky, under a court decree,
transfers her one-half interest in the stock to Sammy so that he
is the sole owner of the business. Sammy transfers his interest in
the community checking account to Becky and, in addition, pays
her $35 from his separate property. Becky realizes a gain of $30
on the transfer. Under similar facts, the Tax Court held in Car-
rieres v. Commissioner"' that the wife only recognized that pro-
105. Cf. Long v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 471 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 818
(1949); Rouse v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1947); Johnson v. United States,
135 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1943); I.R.C. § 1012 (1982).
106. Walz v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 718 (1935).
107. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
108. Siewert v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 326, 333 (1979); Conner v. Commissioner, 34
T.C.M. (CCH) 1043 (1975); Showalter v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 192, 195
(1974); Edwards v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 65, 69 (1954). Cf. Hornback v. United States,
298 F. Supp. 977 (W.D. Mo. 1969) (jointly held property exchanged for recipient's note
held taxable).
109. Carrieres, 64 T.C. at 965.
110. Id. Where wife received more than half the jointly held property, transferor
husband recognized gain equal to the amount of excess joint property because wife had
exchanged marital rights therefore. Rev. Rul. 74-347, 1974-2 C.B. 26. See also supra note
34 and accompanying text.
111. 64 T.C. 959 (1975), aff'd per curiam, 552 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1977).
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portion of the gain which "the separate property received in the
exchange bears to the total property received.""' 2 Applying Car-
rieres to Sammy and Becky's division, Becky would recognize a
taxable gain of $21.11' If there had been sufficient community
property available to divide equally, no gain would have been
recognized on the transfer. The use of some "separate cash to
purchase part of the community"" 4 does not remove the protec-
tion of the "nonrecognition principle to the extent of the value
of the community property retained"'1 5 in the division. "Other-
wise, there would be introduced a 'cliff effect' under which the
use of even $1 of separate property to remedy a disparity in the
division of community property would render the nonrecognition
principle inapplicable. '"1 6 Since part of the transfer is in sub-
stance a "purchase and sale transaction '  rather than a simple
division, to the extent that separate property is used to make
the division even the hybrid rule developed by Judge Hall in the
Carrieres case limits the recognition of gain." 8 It is not that the
gain is recognized to the full extent of the separate property
received, but rather that the presence of separate property is
weighted against the community property received in calculating
gain.119
2. Equitable Apportionment-Dodging Davis
Courts have tried to avoid the application of Davis where
the division of assets has been approximately equal,120 or the
application of the Davis principle would not benefit either
112. Id. at 966-67.
113. $35 of Sammy's separate property plus the community checking account ($30)
equals $65 of total property received by Becky. After deducting one-half of the commu-
nity basis ($20), Becky's realized gain is $30. Under Carrieres, Becky's realized gain is
$16.
114. Carrieres, 64 T.C. at 965. A loan is treated as separate property. Where the
proceeds of a loan are used to buy out a spousal interest in community property, the
exchange of separate property (the proceeds of the loan) for community property is a
taxable event. Siewert v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 326 (1979). Compare Gerlach v. Com-
missioner, 55 T.C. 156 (1970) (separate cash exchanged for community interest) with
Davenport v. Commissioner, 12 T.C.M. (CCH) 856 (1953) (community cash exchanged
for other community property).
115. Carrieres, 64 T.C. at 965.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 966.
119. Id.
120. Collins v. Commissioner, 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969); Imel v. United States,
375 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1973), aff'd, 523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975).
[Vol. 7:441
Reforming Tax Treatment of Divorce
spouse.12' This generally occurs in property divisions pursuant
to an equitable apportionment statute in common-law states.
Unlike community property statutes which clearly distinguish
between separate and community property from the moment of
acquisition, equitable apportionment statutes often follow com-
mon-law title to property until apportionment rights attach at
the time of divorce.'22 Whether such a right is a form of co-
ownership equivalent to community property, or a lien against
property owned by one's spouse, is a matter of state law.'28 The
Davis principle was only applied in the latter case. However, the
equitable apportionment doctrine has relevancy to the commu-
nity property law where the doctrine of equitable apportionment
has been incorporated into the substantive law of community
property states. 2 4 The consequent transfers of community prop-
erty in unequal amounts trigger gain to the transferor spouse
unless an exception to the Davis principle is found. 2 5
Federal courts determining a tax controversy relating to
property division have tried to avoid the application of Davis
where the highest state court held the wife's rights under an
equitable apportionment statute were similar to community
property rights,2 6 or where the state divorce court awarded
property on the assumption that the division was not a taxable
event.12 7 The Tenth Circuit and the Tax Court travel along dif-
ferent roads to come to a nonrecognition result in marital prop-
erty transfers occurring in common-law states.
The Tenth Circuit took a co-ownership approach in Collins
v. Commissioner.1" Based on a decision of the highest state
court that the wife had a "species of common ownership"' 2 9
which vested prior to the transfer of separate property, the
Tenth Circuit held-despite a Davis-like fact situation-that
121. See, e.g., Cook v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 512 (1983).
122. See, e.g., N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney Supp. 1983-84).
123. See Davis, 370 U.S. at 70-71; Estate of Gamble v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 942
(1978).
124. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.080 (1983); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63
(Vernon Supp. 1982-83).
125. Taylor v. Campbell, 335 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1964); Stevens v. Commissioner, 44
T.C.M. (CCH) 220 (1982).
126. See, e.g., Collins v. Commissioner, 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969).
127. Cook v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 512 (1983).
128. 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969).
129. Id. at 212 (quoting Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'r, 446 P.2d 290, 295 (Okla.
1968)). But see Wallace v. United States, 439 F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1971) (Iowa statute).
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the transfer from husband to wife did not trigger gain. 3 ' The
Collins court stated that once the state's highest court inter-
preted state property law, there was "no need to search state law
for indications of other factors that might signify the nature of
the wife's property interest."'' In a later case, Imel v. United
States,'3' the district court reiterated the Collins holding that
co-ownership may exist under state law regardless of descenda-
ble rights and rights of management which may or may not exist
in the co-owner.' 33 It followed that there was no settlement of a
claim with appreciated property. In constrast to Davis, the
transfer merely affected a division of property between the two
co-owners on which gain or loss was not recognized.
When the Tenth Circuit construed a Kansas statute in
Wiles v. Commissioner,134 the court made clear that its co-
ownership theory was grounded on state decision and not a stat-
ute. Although the equitable distribution statute interpreted in
Collins was based on the Kansas model, a property division pur-
suant to the original Kansas statute was held by the Tenth Cir-
cuit to result in a Davis gain.135 In the absence of a decision by
the state's highest court determining property rights, a federal
court decided that a tax case is not bound by lower state court
decisions."6 Thus, Davis is still the general principle in transfers
of separate property or unequal portions of community property.
In an effort to avoid gain recognition, state courts have
based their award of property on grounds that would avoid the
consequences of Davis. This reasoning was followed by the Tax
Court in Cook v. Commissioner,3 7 in the face of a ruling by Con-
necticut's highest court in Thomas v. Thomas"8 that a wife's
rights under the equitable apportionment statute did not give
her a species of co-ownership. Nevertheless, a transfer of prop-
erty owned by a husband was held to be a nontaxable division. 39
130. Collins, 412 F.2d at 212.
131. Id.
132. 375 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1974), aff'd, 523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975).
133. Id. at 1112.
134. 499 F.2d 255, 258 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974). Davis "did not
establish a federal standard as to the nature of pre-transfer rights in the transferred
property." Imel, 523 F.2d at 856.
135. Wiles, 499 F.2d at 258.
136. See Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 457 (1967).
137. 80 T.C. 512 (1983).
138. 159 Conn. 477, 271 A.2d 62 (1970).
139. Cook, 80 T.C. at 528.
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In Cook, the husband had title to property which had appreci-
ated an amount exceeding one million dollars during their
thirty-three-year marriage.140 Because of his wife's desire to keep
the property in the family, the high basis would not benefit her.
Although the decree stated no reason for the transfer, the trial
judge testified that he felt the property (Proctor and Gamble
stock and family-owned real estate) rightfully belonged to the
wife because it was given to the husband by the wife"' (the for-
mer Sheila Gamble) and her family in recognition of their mar-
riage. Divorce was compared to the breach of the marriage con-
tract and transfer equivalent to the remedy of rescission. " 2 By
searching the grounds for the decision, the Tax Court created a
new path around Davis by treating the divorce as the termina-
tion of an ordinary commercial contract."
It is ironic that equal divisions of marital property in com-
mon-law states are not taxed because they are analogous to com-
munity property divisions. Yet, equal divisions in community
property states are taxed under Davis because the source of the
transfer is separate property. There is little doubt that the
application of the Davis case to property divisions is one of the
great tangles of the I.R.C., state statutes, and developing case
law. The inequity of one party to a divorce bearing the entire
tax burden and the inability to forecast accurately whether
Davis applies to a property division have created pressure to
overturn the Davis rule.
3. Triggering Income-The Basis Principles
Davis has been criticized for two reasons. First, income is
triggered at the time of a divorce, a time when liquidity is usu-
ally strained. Second, variations in local law lead to disparate
tax results for substantially comparable transactions occurring
in different states. Both problems need to be addressed, but
unfortunately, only the former problem is eliminated by the
Task Force proposal or the bill.
The Davis case has been criticized on the grounds that
140. Id. at 513.
141. Id. at 517.
142. Id. at 527-28.
143. Cf. Beard v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1275 (1981) (settlement predicated on a
partnership theory so periodic payments were capital in nature and not alimony. If pay-
ments are found to be capital in nature, then the quid pro quo of surrendered property
rights is but one factor to consider.)
1984]
462 University of Puget Sound Law Review
"divorce is simply an inappropriate time for triggering a gain
implicit in appreciated property"1 " " and that the Davis rule
tends to exacerbate liquidity problems.' 45 Where economic cir-
cumstances force the wife to sell her share of marital assets, the
Davis rule normally precludes gain recognition because the
wife's basis in the property is its fair market value.146 Critics of
Davis propose that no gain or loss be recognized on transfer. 47
Hence, the wife will have a carry-over basis in the asset
received. 4 8 The gain implicit in the asset will be recognized by
the wife upon the sale. 49 The net effect of the proposed change
is that the tax liability shifts from the husband to the wife.
The problem with Davis lies in the basis principles rather
than in the recognition principles. The injustice of the Davis
case comes not in the recognition of gain by the transferor
rather than the transferee, but in the disparity of the basis of
the property that will or will not produce the gain. 50 By shifting
low- or high-basis assets, the couple can determine which of
them will bear the bulk of the tax burden. The tax burden on
the appreciation of property acquired during marriage may still
be borne by one side despite reversal of Davis.
144. Technical Memorandum, supra note 81, at 2.
145. Id.
146. Davis, 370 U.S. at 73.
147. Technical Memorandum, supra note 81, at 5-7; H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 192 (1983).
148. In an equal division of jointly held or community property, the assets received
by each party retain their pre-divorce basis and holding period. Rev. Rul. 81-292, 1981-2
C.B. 158, 159. See Beth W. Corp. v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 1190 (S.D. Fla. 1972)
aff'd mem., 481 F.2d 1401 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 916 (1974); H.R. REP.
No. 432, 98th Cong., 1st Sass. 192 (1983).
149. See Rev. Rul. 81-292, 1981-2 C.B. 158, 159.
150. Tax characteristics other than basis also affect the economic value of property
received in a divorce settlement. Compare I.R.C. § 1221 (1982) (capital assets); I.R.C. §
1231 (1982) (trade or business assets; conversions) with I.R.C. § 47 (1982) (recapture of
investment tax credits); I.R.C. § 1239 (1982) (gain recognized on transfer of depreciable
property between spouses prior to interlocutory decree of divorce ineligible for capital
gain rates. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1239-1(c)(1) (1978)); I.R.C. § 1245 (1983) (post-1961
depreciation recapture); I.R.C. § 1250 (1983) (post-1963 depreciation recapture on lim-
ited types of real property transfers). If the former sections are applicable to the gain on
the sale of the property received in the divorce settlement, the assets may be eligible for
favorable tax rates. Application of the latter sections causes gain to be taxed at the much
higher ordinary income rates. I.R.C. § 306 (1982) (preferred stock disposition); I.R.C. §
341 (1982) (collapsible corporation stock); I.R.C. § 751 (1982) (partnership interest). See
also I.R.C. § 121 (1982) (gain from sale of principal residence by taxpayer, aged 55 or
over tax exempt up to $125,000, $62,500 for married filing separate return); I.R.C. § 1034
(1982) (nonrecognition of gain on sale of principal residence if replaced within two
years). Recognition of a loss is limited. See infra text accompanying note 186.
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To illustrate how this can arise, suppose Sammy owns two
assets, each worth $100. The basis of stock A is $10 and the
basis of stock B is $40. Under the Davis rule, the transfer of
stock A to Becky on divorce would trigger a gain recognition to
Sammy of $90 at a tax cost of $18. However, if instead he trans-
ferred stock B to Becky, his gain would be only $60. In either
case, Becky would take the asset at fair market value with a
basis of $100.151 On its sale, she would recognize no gain. Revers-
ing the Davis rule still would not necessarily make the tax bur-
den equal between the parties because, under this example, for
instance, Becky would bear the tax cost of $18 and net $82 upon
divorce. The carry-over basis principles " 2 apparently allow an
even split to come out uneven upon the sale of the asset. A
change in the Davis principles should be aimed at compensation
for the unequal basis and other tax characteristics of property
acquired in the dissolution of a marriage. Where two assets
worth $100 have bases of $10 and $90, respectively, equality of
tax attributes may in theory be achieved if the bases of theproperties are aggregated and reapportioned in accordance with
their fair market value. The division would result in each asset
having a basis of $50 and an inherent gain of $50. A way to
achieve this result is to permit the parties to agree to a nontax-
able cash payment equalizing the anticipated amounts of tax lia-
bility which eventually will be recognized upon sale of the prop-
erty. Yet, such payment without statutory sanction may be itself
taxable under the theory that the spouse making the equaliza-
tion payment is in effect paying the obligation of the recipient.
Under Old Colony Trust,5 8 this results in additional alimony
151. See St. Joseph Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 716 F.2d 1180, 1185 (7th
Cir. 1983).
152. Rev. Rul. 81-292, 1981-2 C.B. 158, 159 (jointly held property); Rev. RUl. 76-83,1976-1 C.B. 213 (community property); see Beth W. Corp v. United States, 350 F. Supp.
1190, 1192 (S.D. Fla. 1972), afl'd mem., 481 F.2d 1401 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 916 (1974).
153. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929) (employer's pay-ment of tax on salaries is taxable income to employee). See Mahana v. United States, 88F. Supp. 285 (Ct. Cl. 1950), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 978, reh'g denied, 340 U.S. 847 (1950)
(payment of wife's tax on guaranteed trust yield held alimony); Neeman v. Commis-
sioner, 13 T.C. 397 (1949), afl'd, 200 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 956(1953). One might argue under current law that a single payment in the divorce context
would be nontaxable alimony. Under current law, a single payment is not treated as
periodic and hence does not qualify as alimony under § 71. Under the proposals toamend § 71, the couple could stipulate that the payment is not income to the recipientnor deductible by the payor. See H.R. 4170, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 423(a) (1983)
(amends I.R.C. § 71(a) (1982)).
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income to the recipient.
A second alternative solution to the hardship of gain recog-
nition is to permit gain to be recognized in installments over a
period of years if the Davis rule is applied to a divorce
transfer. 154
V. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS TO CHANGE THE TAXATION OF
DIVORCE
Congress is considering substantial amendments to the
I.R.C. regarding taxation of divorce. The Tax Reform Act of
198315 (hereinafter "bill") currently under consideration would
for the first time regulate property division incident to divorce
and significantly change the alimony provisions of the I.R.C.
The bill is based in large part on the legislative proposals made
by the Task Force to change the taxation of divorce.
A. Property Division-The Demise of Davis
A primary goal of the bill is to overturn the Davis rule
which triggers gain to the transferor upon divorce. 156 Under the
bill, all transfers of property related to divorce are treated as
nontaxable divisions of property.157 The nonrecognition rule
applies whether the division is of jointly held property or sepa-
rate property, and whether the division is in equal or unequal
shares. The basis to the recipient is the same as that of the
transferor prior to the transfer. 158 The recipient of the transfer is
denied a step-up (or step-down) in basis. " Its mechanical appli-
cation excludes any election to choose recognition upon
exchange if so desired.
In contrast to the bill, the Task Force proposed that if both
154. Cf. I.R.C. § 6166 (1982) (estate tax extension where estate included closely held
business interest); I.R.C. § 402(e) (1982) (formula for favorable tax rates on portion of
lump sum distribution).
155. H.R. 4170, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
156. See H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 191-92 (1983).
157. H.R. 4170, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., § 422(a) (1983) (adds I.R.C. § 1041(a)). Trans-
fers are treated as gifts of property. Id. at § 422(a) (adds I.R.C. § 1041(b)(1)).
158. Id. at § 422(a) (adds I.R.C. § 1041(b)(2)).
159. Id. at § 422(a). The bill applies to property transferred between spouses or
between former spouses if the transfer is incident to divorce. H.R. 4170, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 422(a) (1983) (adds I.R.C. § 1041(a)) (annulment not mentioned in bill). Nonrec-
ognition rules do not apply to antenuptial agreements. Id. See Farid-Es-Sultaneh v.
Commissioner, 160 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947) (release of marital rights in exchange for
property held taxable).
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parties agree in writing, the couple should be permitted to "elect
out" of the nonrecognition provision. The election would be sim-
ilar to that now allowed under I.R.C. section 453(d), under
which a taxpayer can avoid installment sale treatment under
certain conditions."" Under the Task Force proposal, the couple
may choose recognition of gain or loss to the transferor of prop-
erty and a fair market value basis to the recipient of the prop-
erty.161 However, under the Task Force proposal, the election
must cover all property divided between the spouses, and in the
absence of an agreement the nonrecognition rules embodied in
the bill apply automatically.' 62
The mechanical application of the nonrecognition rules
under the bill does not have the inherent equity of the direct
election of tax treatment by the parties. Assuming a spouse
receives property without any tax burden, that portion of prop-
erty the spouse receives should theoretically be valued more
than a portion burdened with potential gain recognition. The
nonrecognition rule proposed by the Task Force and the bill will
superficially produce a fair division of the tax burden. However,
a closer analysis reveals that the problems of Davis linger.
If only one spouse transfers property in the division, the
bill's basis principle operates in a manner analogous to the gift
tax basis 6 ' where (with certain adjustments not applicable to
divorce basis) the donee takes the donor's basis in the gift. If
each spouse transfers property, however, application of the gift
basis analogy becomes strained. The transaction is more closely
analogous, for tax purposes, to a sale than to a gift."" Unlike the
typical nonrecognition transaction involving an exchange where
gain or loss is frozen in the taxpayer's basis in newly acquired
property, 65 under the bill the transferor's basis is grafted onto
the property and the inherent gain or loss travels with the prop-
erty to its new owner.
160. Technical Memorandum, supra note 81, at 11.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. I.R.C. § 1015 (1982).
164. H.R. 4170, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 422 (1983) (adds I.R.C. § 1041(b)(2)). Unlike
the gift basis rules under I.R.C. § 1015 (1982), the recipient spouse takes transferor's
basis whether transferred property is appreciated or depreciated. Thus, the basis rules
do not impede recognition by recipient spouse. H. R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
192 (1983).
165. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 358(a)(1), 1031(d), 1033(b) (1982).
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The basis principle 6 operates in a peculiar way when
applied to reciprocal transfers between husband and wife.
Assume now that Sammy and Becky each have separate prop-
erty. Sammy owns 100 shares of X stock, basis $100, fair market
value $1,000. Becky owns 100 shares of Y stock, basis $500, fair
market value $1,000. Under a divorce decree, Becky is ordered to
transfer 50 shares of Y stock to Sammy and Sammy is ordered
to transfer 50 shares of X to Becky. Under the Davis case, each
party recognizes a gain on the transfer. The recipient in each
case takes a fair market value basis in the stock received. Becky
recognizes a gain of $250 on the transfer of Y, and Sammy's Y
basis is increased to $500. Sammy recognizes a gain of $450 on
his transfer. Becky's basis in X is increased to $500. There is no
change in the basis of the retained stock. Obviously, the tax cost
of the division is not equally distributed between Becky and
Sammy under Davis.
The effect of the bill's carry-over basis principle in this case
is to divide the assets and redistribute the bases evenly between
the spouses. This result, however, is a purely coincidental divi-
sion of the tax consequences since each party's stock portfolio
now has an aggregate basis of $300, with a fair market value of
$1,000.
The bill fails to grapple with the realities of property trans-
fer incident to divorce. For instance, consider a situation where
Becky owns Whiteacre, basis $10, fair market value $100, and
trades it with Sammy for Blackacre, basis $25, fair market value
$100. In this presumed like-kind exchange, 6" where gain or loss
goes unrecognized at the time of the exchange, the transferor's
basis for the traded property is ordinarily preserved and applied
to the property received.168 (Here, Becky's basis in Blackacre
continues to be $10, her former basis in Whiteacre.) Under the
bill, by contrast, the transferor's basis would be grafted onto the
property and the gain or loss would travel with the property to
its new owner.
The effect of this provision causes one of the most pervasive
changes in the treatment of nonrecognition transfers. The effect
is a trade, not only of property alone, but of tax consequences as
166. H.R. 4170, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 422 (1983) (adds I.R.C. § 1041(b)(2)).
167. It is assumed that the transaction qualifies as a like-kind exchange under I.R.C.
§ 1031(a) (1982).
168. But cf. I.R.C. § 1032 (1982) (transferee corporation takes the transferor's
basis).
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well. Becky's basis in Blackacre is not $10 (her basis in White-
acre), but $25 (Sammy's basis in Blackacre). If Becky sells
Blackacre immediately after the trade, her recognized gain is
reduced from $90 to $75. Consequently, Becky's tax burden has
been partially shifted to Sammy.
The migrating basis can also occur in community property
exchanges. Suppose Sammy and Becky own both X and Y
stocks as jointly owned or community assets. Sammy receives all
of X and Becky receives all of Y. The basis of the property to
each spouse will differ, although the fair market value is equal.
Before divorce, Becky owned a one-half interest (or $500 worth)
of X, basis $250. Her potential gain was $250. Becky also owned
$500 worth of Y, basis $50. Her potential gain was $450. After
divorce, she owns $1,000 worth of Y, basis $100. Her potential
gain is $900, or $200 greater. The bill does nothing to divide the
tax consequences evenly between the parties. This result per-
petuates the problem in the current law.
The problem of unequal basis in property acquired in a
divorce settlement can have a startling result. As in the original
Davis case, all the tax on appreciation of assets owned during
the marriage can be ascribed to one spouse. Assume still that
Sammy and Becky own stocks X and Y jointly or as communityproperty, but that this time, Sammy receives both stocks and
pays Becky $1,000 cash borrowed by pledging the stock. Becky
has clearly realized a gain of $700 on her one-half of the commu-
nity property. Under current law, the exchange would result in
recognition of gain, because it is an exchange of community
property for separate property, rather than a division of co-
owned property. Under the bill, however, the gain is not recog-nized. 69 Sammy does not receive a fair market value basis. If he
sells both stocks he will recognize the gain on the entire appreci-
ation of the stock. Becky essentially escapes the tax burden.
Thus, the problem goes through the looking glass and becomes
the mirror image of the Davis problem. The bill does not pre-
vent the inequity of a Davis-like result-assets are divided but
only one spouse carries the tax burden.
A more curious result occurs where Sammy and Becky
jointly own all assets during marriage. On divorce, Sammy takes
169. H.R. 4170, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. § 422(a) (1983) (adds I.R.C. § 1041(a)); H. R.
RmP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 192 (1983); accord Technical Memorandum, supra
note 81, at 10.
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the assets. This time, Sammy gives Becky his note for $1,000.
Under current law, as the transfer of Becky's community inter-
est in the stock is in exchange for the note (a separate asset), it
would result in recognition of gain exactly as it did when Becky
received cash. Under the bill, since a transfer incident to divorce
does not result in gain or loss, Becky receives the note without
recognition of gain or loss. Sammy's basis in his new stock is
Becky's old basis. But what is Becky's basis in the note? Under
the bill, one possibility is that Becky's basis is Sammy's basis.
But what is Sammy's basis? Neither the bill nor the Committee
report provides an answer. There are three possible answers.
First, it may be argued that since Sammy is the maker of the
note, his basis is zero. 170 If a literal interpretation of the bill is
applied, Becky's basis upon exchange of her interest in the
jointly owned property is zero. It follows then that the entire fair
market value17 1 of the property exchanged will be recognized by
Becky. Becky loses the benefit of her original basis. Further, her
gain upon payment of the note may be ordinary income.7 2
Sammy, on the other hand, receives the benefit of Becky's basis
in the previously jointly held property. 7 3
Unfortunately, this results in a tax burden much larger than
under current law. Becky is taxed at ordinary income rates on
the value of the note, while Sammy is taxed at capital gain rates
for the difference between the aggregate of his original basis plus
Becky's basis and the fair market value of the property. 17
Yet another possible alternative is that Sammy's basis in
the note is equal to the basis of the property received. 7 5 Under
this theory, Becky's basis will ricochet to her. In such case,
assuming Sammy sells the property at a gain, Sammy and Becky
170. Cf. Rev. Rul. 74-503, 1974-2 C.B. 117 (a corporation always has zero basis in its
own stock); I.R.C. § 307(b) (1982) (zero basis for certain stock rights elective); I.R.C. §
362(c) (1982) (zero basis for certain capital contributions by nonshareholders); Fehrs Fin.
Co. v. Commissioner, 487 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 938 (1974).
171. In the example, assume Becky is to be a cash method taxpayer. If Becky were
an accrual method taxpayer, the face value of the note would constitute the amount
realized in the transaction.
172. See Bingham v. Commissioner, 105 F.2d 971, 972 (2d Cir. 1939). Cf. Fairbanks
v. United States, 306 U.S. 436 (1939) (redemption of bonds before maturity and prior to
enactment of I.R.C. § 1232 (1982)).
173. H.R. 4170, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 422(a) (1983) (adds I.R.C. § 1041(b)(2)).
174. Id.
175. Cf. I.R.C. § 362(a) (1983) (property acquired by corporation has basis equal to
what it would have had in hands of transferor, increased by amount of gain recognized to
transferor on such transfer).
[Vol. 7:441
Reforming Tax Treatment of Divorce
each will be taxed on the appreciation of the same asset. In the
original Davis property settlement, the government avoided this
result by setting the wife's basis in the marital rights as the fair
market value of the rights at the time of the divorce. Therefore,
she did not recognize any gain on the exchange. 17  Under the
bill, if it is deemed that Sammy's basis in the note is equal to
Becky's basis in her stock, on the sale of the stock and the col-
lection of the note by the respective parties, both parties will
recognize gain resulting in double taxation. This result occurs in
various nonrecognition transactions. 1 7
A third alternative is that the note represents a bargained-
for exchange. Sammy's basis is that of a purchaser. If Sammy is
thus entitled to a cost basis, then it is presumed that both sides
of an arm's-length transaction are equal.178 Hence, Sammy's
basis in the note is the fair market value of the property he
received in exchange for the note. Becky's basis in the note
(derived from Sammy's basis in the note) is the fair market
value of the property exchanged. The result of such a principle
is that Becky will not recognize a gain on receipt of the note. If
this is so, then she has disposed of an asset without recognizing
gain. Hence, Sammy is left with the original basis in the prop-
erty and all the potential tax burden. The same result occurred
above when Becky received cash.
The first and second examples result in double taxation.
The third result, similar to the Davis case, appears to be more
plausible. But it too is inconsistent with the intent of the bill. It
appears that a simple mechanical application of the proposed
carry-over basis rules does not accomplish the sponsor's
intent.1 79
176. See Rev. Rul. 67-221, 1967-2 C.B. 63.
177. Compare I.R.C. § 1031 (1982) (carry-over basis) with I.R.C. § 362 (1982) (sub-
stituted basis) and I.R.C. § 358 (1982) (carry-over basis). In the latter case, the trans-
feror of property to a corporation in exchange for corporate securities takes a carryover
basis in the property equal to the former basis in the property transferred, while thecorporation takes a substituted basis in the property equal to its transferor's former
basis. Hence, if Becky transferred Blackacre, basis $10 to S Co. in exchange for S Co.
stock in a nonrecognition transaction, Becky's basis in her S Co. stock is $10. S Co.'s
basis in Blackacre is also $10. Although a corporation has a zero basis in its own stock,
the substituted basis rule avoids the zero basis problem. Cf. I.R.C. § 1032 (1983) (corpo-
ration recognizes no gain on exchange of its stock for property).
178. Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184, 189 (Ct.
Cl. 1954).
179. See H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 191 (1983) (the committee believes
it is inappropriate to tax interspousal transfers).
1984]
470 University of Puget Sound Law Review
B. Transfer of Assets Subject to Liability
Under the bill, the provisions for automatic nonrecognition
and a carry-over basis for transfers between spouses preclude
application of the ordinary principles concerning recognition of
gain on the transfer of assets subject to tax liability. Assume
Sammy owns a farm with a fair market value of $200, and a
basis of $100. Sammy mortgages it for $100 cash. He then trans-
fers the farm to Becky. Under the bill, Becky's assumption of
the mortgage will not cause recognition of gain to Sammy under
Crane v. Commissioner.180 The bill extends the principles apply-
ing to equal division of community property to all transfers
between spouses.181
Under current law, the transfers of property subject to lia-
bility in excess of basis result in a recognition of gain, even in a
gift transaction. 8 2 Under the proposed legislation, the nonrecog-
nition of gain upon a transfer of property where liability exceeds
basis may be correct in principle. Yet, one can imagine the
potential for tax abuse. Suppose, for example, that Sammy,
whose assets are highly appreciated, meets Becky, a prospective
buyer, through a personal ad in the financial section of a super-
market tabloid. 8 Sammy and Becky marry, mortgage the prop-
erty for close to the fair market value with Aggressive National
Bank, and then divide their property equally. Becky receives the
asset and Sammy receives the cash. If this scheme is considered
a sham,'8 4 it will not be successful tax-wise. However, if Becky
and Sammy's marriage was not a sham, under the bill, the same
loan would allow Sammy to bail out cash from the asset tax-free.
Nevertheless, where the amount of liability exceeds the
180. 331 U.S. 1, 4 (1947). See Technical Memorandum, supra note 81, at 10; H.R.
REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 192 (1983).
181. Compare Rev. Rul. 76-83, 1976-1 C.B. 213; Rev. Rul. 74-347, 1974-2 C.B. 26,
with H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 192 (1983) (the rulings require equal divi-
sions of property to avoid any recognition of gain or loss; the house bill does not require
an equitable division to avoid recognition of a gain or loss).
182. Diedrich v. Commissioner, 457 U.S. 191, 192 (1982).
183. The author has no personal knowledge of such advertisements, but acknowl-
edges the suggestion by law professor J. David Fine.
184. In Boyter v. Commissioner, 668 F.2d 1382 (4th Cir. 1981), an annual divorce
ritual was ignored for tax purposes. The Boyters divorced in December and remarried in
January of the following year in order to file as single taxpayers. Id. at 1384. The court
held that the sham transaction doctrine might apply to the Boyter divorce and
remanded for such consideration. Id. at 1388. Cf. Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361,
366 (1960) (insurance annuity transaction was a sham and did not create an indebted-
ness that supported the deductions claimed).
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basis of an asset, the consequences of gain recognition may pro-
duce hardship for many couples who are not seeking to avoid
taxes. As an alternative to the initial recommendation of a blan-
ket nonrecognition provision, the Task Force proposed that the
recognition of gain be limited to the amount by which the liabili-
ties exceed basis. 185 The Task Force also proposed that the rec-
ognition rule be limited in time to encompass only liabilities
incurred to facilitate a property settlement in connection with a
divorce.
C. Collateral Problems
Additional problems flow from finding that a transfer in a
property division is taxable. Losses are not allowed to be recog-
nized in transfers between husband and wife. 86 Under the bill,
losses would not be allowed in three instances: transfers which
were made during marriage; transfers which were made within
one year after the divorce; and, transfers which were related to
the divorce. 187 Hence, losses are not recognized even if the trans-
fer takes place after the final decree. Personal losses are not
deductible.8 8 In addition, the bill deletes certain penalty provi-
sions now applicable to divorce transfers in which gain is
recognized.1"9
D. Alimony
1. Current Law
Prior to 1942,190 support payments to a former wife were not
185. Cf. I.R.C. § 357(c) (1982), cited in Technical Memorandum, supra note 81, at
app. II.
186. I.R.C. § 267 (1982); McWilliams v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 694, 699 (1947). Seealso Merritt v. Commissioner, 400 F.2d 417, 421 (5th Cir. 1968) (lack of tax avoidance
motive irrelevant).
187. H.R. 4170, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. tit. IV, § 422(a) (1983) (adds I.R.C. § 1041(a),
(c)). H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 192 (1983).
188. See I.R.C. §§ 165(c), 262 (1982).
189. See I.R.C. §§ 453(g), 1239 (1982). Further, the Bill fails to address the questionof whether interest is imputed to property settlements under I.R.C. § 483 (1982). TheThird Circuit, in Fox v. United States, 510 F.2d 1330 (3rd Cir. 1975), and the Tax Courtin Gammill v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 921 (1980) held that I.R.C. § 483 does not apply toproperty settlements. But see Gerladh v. United States, 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9425(Ct. CI. 1973) (I.R.C. § 483 applicable to installment payments of taxable property
settlement).
190. The predecessor to I.R.C. § 71 (1982) was enacted in the Revenue Act of 1942.The Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 753, § 120(a), 56 Stat. 816, 817, added § 22(k) tothe Internal Revenue Code of 1939. No substantive changes were made in the 1954 Inter-
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deductible.191 When wartime tax rates"" created pressure for
apportionment of income and income tax liability between the
former spouses, Congress passed the alimony provisions of the
I.R.C. to relieve the husband from the "double burden" 93 of
paying alimony with after-tax dollars. The relief shifted the tax
burden to the wife. 94 Alimony is gross income to the recipient 95
and a deduction to determine adjusted gross income for the
payor.19
The current statute creates a divorce premium.9 7 Combined
with the assignment of income for tax purposes, the single tax-
payer or head of household rates usually result in lower overall
tax liability compared to filing a joint return. This lower overall
rate is problematical. Since the divorced spouses do not form an
economic unit, the tax benefit inures to the payor, usually the
husband.
Under current law, alimony treatment is determined by
whether the transfer is for the support 98 of the recipient or a
division of commingled property."9 ' Specifically, alimony is
nal Revenue Code. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Seas. 170, reprinted in 1954 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4025.
191. Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 157 (1917).
192. Wartime tax rates for taxpayer with an income of $50,000 rose to 75% in 1944.
Peschel, Income Taxation of Alimony Payments Attributable to Transferred Property:
Congressional Confusion, 44 TUL. L. REV. 223, 225 n.5 (1970).
193. S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Seas. (1942), reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 504,
568.
194. The sections of the Code taxing alimony divide the income tax burden between
former spouses in a manner which is roughly equivalent to filing a joint return prior to
divorce. Peschel, supra note 192, at 226.
195. I.R.C. § 71 (1982).
196. I.R.C. § 215 (1982).
197. See H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 1st Seas. 194 (1983). The report suggests
that if A and B have respective incomes of $50,000 and $10,000, then their taxes owed in
1983 as single taxpayers are $14,738 and $1,121, respectively. The combined tax is
$15,859. If A and B are married, filing jointly the combined tax is $15,574. If A and B are
divorced and A pays B $20,000 in alimony, they each pay $6,477. The combined tax is
$12,954. Id. Cf. Druker v. Commissioner, 697 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1982) (marriage penalty is
not unconstitutional), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2429 (1983).
198. Smith's Estate v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 349, 351 (3d Cir. 1953); Treas. Reg.
§§ 1.71-1(b)(4), 1.71-1(d)(3)(i)(b) (1960). But see Mivec v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M.
(CCH) 24 (1981) (alimony treatment for periodic payments exceeding the wife's pre-
divorce interest in marital property).
199. See Campbell v. Lake, 220 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1955); Beard v. Commissioner, 77
T.C. 1275 (1981); Fisher v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1851 (1978); Treas. Reg. §
1.71-1(b) (1960).
Section 71(a) applies only to payments made because of the family or marital
relationship in recognition of the general obligation to support which is made
specific by the decree, instrument, or agreement. Thus, section 71(a) does not
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defined as a periodic payment, 00 received by the wife in dis-
charge of the husband's legal obligation to support,20 1 and
incurred under a divorce decree, written separation agreement,
or decree for support.20 2 The periodic payment requirement gen-
erally excludes payments of a principle sum210 -one that can be
calculated by simple arithmetic-from the definition of alimony.
Contingent payments '4 and payments made over a period
exceeding ten years205 are deemed periodic.
Despite its rigorous requirements, the Code does not distin-
guish alimony from property settlements. A property settlement
under state law may be classified as alimony for federal tax pur-
poses under the current law 06 and under the proposed legisla-
tive reforms. The potential effect is to change a tax-free distri-
bution into gross income.0 7 Although in the past a lack of
property rights under state law would destroy a wife's claim that
payments were a nontaxable property settlement, today virtually
every state08 permits or requires a property division on divorce.
Because characterization of the payment in dispute is treated as
a question of fact, dependent upon both the subjective intent209
apply to that part of any periodic payment which is attributable to the repay-
ment by the husband of, for example, a bona fide loan previously made to him
by the wife, the satisfaction of which is specified in the decree, instrument, or
agreement as a part of the general settlement between the husband and wife.
Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(4) (1960).
200. I.R.C. § 71(a) (1982).
201. See Taylor v. Campbell, 335 F.2d 841, 845-46 (5th Cir. 1964); Bardwell v. Com-
missioner, 318 F.2d 786, 789 (10th Cir. 1963) (legal obligation of support is independent
of state law).
202. See Brodersen v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 412, 415-16 (1971); see also I.R.C. §
71(a) (1982).
203. I.R.C. § 71(c) (1960).
204. Fidler v. Commissioner, 231 F.2d 138 (9th Cir. 1956) (the contingency was that
payments would be reduced if H lost his job); Scofield v. Greer, 185 F.2d 551 (5th Cir.
1950) (payments were to stop in the event of remarriage); Ryker v. Commissioner, 33
T.C. 924 (1960) (contingency was remarriage or death); Rev. Rul. 59-190, 1959-1 C.B. 23
(citing Washington law as to death of either party as contingency); Treas. Reg. § 1.71-
l(d)(3)(ii)(a) (1960).
205. I.R.C. § 71(c) (1982). See Wright v. Commissioner, 543 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1976);
Tracy v. Commissioner 70 T.C. 397 (1978); Hinish v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH)
880 (1978) (back rent was periodic payment); Grabowski v. Commissioner, 21 T.C.M.
(CCH) 249 (1962).
206. Wright, 543 F.2d at 593.
207. See generally Warnach v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 541 (1979), acq., 1979-1 C.B.
1.
208. Mississippi does not give property rights to wives. Bond v. Bond, 355 So. 2d
672, 673 (Miss. 1978).
209. See Porter v. Commissioner, 388 F.2d 670 (6th Cir. 1968). But see Schotten-
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of the parties and the objective existence of the wife's property
rights under state law,21 the outcome of such litigation is uncer-
tain.21  Fact-finding often becomes a "metaphysical 2 1 2 process
as courts search for signs that a challenged payment is "either
support or property settlement, when in reality the payment
possesses a hybrid nature sharing characteristics of both. 21 3
Since it is usually to the husband's advantage to acquire a tax
deduction, many property settlements are cast in the form of
alimony payments.214 On the other hand, the wife may claim
that the payment is excluded from her income as property set-
tlement. The government is caught between the opposing par-
ties. The Task Force proposal addresses the problem.
2. Elective Tax Consequences
The Task Force has proposed amendments to the I.R.C.
regulating alimony. First, in the "private ordering" rules,1 5 the
divorced parties may explicitly choose tax treatment of divorce-
related payments by written agreement. 16 The Task Force
Amendments replace the system whereby tax consequences flow
indirectly from transactional forms, such as property settlement,
with direct choice of correlative tax consequences by the parties:
(a) gross income to the recipient and a deduction for the payor;
or (b) no income and no deduction. Additionally, in the absence
of such election, the Task Force proposes a mechanical identifi-
cation process that eases the requirements of alimony. These
two contradictory goals, one toward mechanical rules, the other
stein v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 451, 460-61 (1981) (tangible property rights needed to
support taxpayer's claim that receipt was property settlement and not alimony).
210. Wright v. Commissioner, 543 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1976).
211. Compare Wright v. Commissioner, 543 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1976), with Lambros
v. Commissioner, 459 F.2d 69 (6th Cir. 1972).
212. Beard v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1275, 1284 (1981).
213. Id. See generally Rev. Proc. 82-53, 1982-2 C.B. 842 (service approved clauses
for I.R.C. §§ 71 & 215 (1982)).
214. See, e.g., Yoakum v. Commissioner, [Current Regular Decisions] TAx CT. REP.
(CCH) Dec. 40, 950 (1984).
215. See generally The "Private Ordering" Concept, supra note 80.
216. The term"written agreement" includes an independent written agreement as
well as a formal separation agreement whether or not merged into a divorce decree.
Technical Memorandum, supra note 81, at 14. There is some authority that a letter
containing a memorandum of a prior oral agreement and not rejected by taxpayer is
sufficient to satisfy requirements of a written instrument under current law. See
Osterbauer v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 1364 (1982) (post-divorce modification).
But cf. Dean v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1237 (1981) (payments made subse-
quent to divorce under agreement held nondeductible as alimony).
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toward direct election by agreement, are characteristic of both
the Task Force proposal and the bill. Together, these goals mark
a comprehensive plan to simplify the tax treatment of alimony.
An important difference between the Task Force proposal and
the bill is that the former balances the mechanical rules with the
opportunity of direct election.
3. New Definitions of Alimony
In lieu of an agreement, the Task Force proposed mechani-
cal rules to determine tax treatment of alimony: cash payments
are to be generally considered alimony ' 17 while property trans-
fers are not.218 Property rights exchanged for cash are excluded
from alimony treatment.2 1 ' An exchange of community assets istreated as a nonrecognition transaction. However, an exchange
of marital rights for cash is taxed as ordinary income to therecipient. For the payor, different treatment occurs as well.
Where there is an exchange of marital rights for cash, the payor
gets a deduction. Where there is an exchange of community
assets, the payor does not get a deduction. The occurrence of a
cash receipt rather than property is, therefore, crucial to thespouse exchanging marital rights for cash or property and of no
significance to the spouse exchanging community property rights
for cash or property.2 2
The key to the Task Force proposal is a new definition of
property rights. Property is defined as including "jointly owned
property, individual or community property rights. Marital
rights or equitable distribution rights are not property rights. ' '22'
217. Technical Memorandum, supra note 81, at 18.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Cf. I.R.C. § 61 (1983); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1(a) (1954) (gross income does not
depend on form of receipt). But see Wright v. Commissioner, 543 F.2d 593, 599 (7th Cir.
1976) (form is a factor distinguishing property settlement from alimony payments). The
proposal changes current law under which the receipt of cash would not be included in a
wife's income nor deductible by a husband if the payment was in exchange for propertyrights. See, e.g., Biddle v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 1361 (1979); Bolza v. Com-
missioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1138 (1981); Pierce v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 840 (1977).221. Technical Memorandum, supra note 81, at 7. The proposal ignores the no-fault
divorce and equitable distribution statutes adopted by most common-law states. Equita-
ble distribution of property became the handmaiden of no-fault divorce laws adopted in48 states. UNiF. MAR. PROP. ACT, prefatory note at 3 (1983). All but two of the 40 tradi-
tional common-law jurisdictions use property division as a principle means of resolving
economic dilemmas on dissolution. Id. The legislative changes made by state govern-ments reflected a fundamental change in the American marriage, namely that today most
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The Task Force proposal makes an exception to ordinary income
treatment of the receipt of cash for marital rights in the case of
a" 'special equities' claim-to the extent that under the applica-
ble state law such a claim . . . traces back to genuine economic
contribution12 2 of the recipient.
4. An Alternative Definition of Alimony
Under the bill, as under current law, alimony payments are
deductible by the payor and included in the gross income of the
recipient.2 23 The bill, however, transforms the process of deter-
mining alimony for tax purposes.224 The current requirement
that alimony payments must be periodic, for support, and pur-
suant to a legal obligation, is eliminated.2 25 The bill continues
the current requirement that payments must be pursuant to an
agreement or decree 226 and adds certain requirements consistent
with current law.227 The parties may designate payments other-
marriages end in divorce. In 1963, 33.69% of total terminations of marriages were by
divorce. Id. at 2. In contrast, by 1979, for the first time a majority of marriages ended in
divorce, 57.23%. Id. at 2. Under no-fault divorce statutes, the right to lifetime support is
traded for an equitable distribution of property accumulated during the marriage. The
proposal would change the tax-free property right to taxable income and thereby dimin-
ish the value of the wife's share of the property.
222. Technical Memorandum, supra note 81, at 7 (emphasis in original). The aura
of simplicity disappears when the exception to the cash rule is applied. It is not merely
the lack of a definition of a "genuine economic contribution" that causes the problem,
but also the premise that wives do not contribute to the accumulation of family wealth.
Therefore, a property division in connection with divorce is perceived as a substitute for
support and not the liquidation share of a partner. This premise ignores the fact that in
over 50% of American marriages, both spouses earn income; in high income marriages
($24,000 or more) the percentage of two-earner households increases to two-thirds. UNIF.
MAR. PROP. ACT, prefatory note at 7 (1983).
223. H.R. 4170, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 423(b) (1983) (amends I.R.C. § 215 (1982))
(child support payments are not deductible under current law. Section 423(b) also
requires the payor to furnish recipient's social security number).
224. H.R. 4170, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 423(a) (1983) (amends I.R.C. § 71(a) (1983)).
225. H. R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 195 (1983); cf. Brodersen v. Commis-
sioner, 57 T.C. 412, 415 (1971) (requirements for alimony under current law).
226. H.R. 4170, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 423(a) (1983) (adds I.R.C. §§
71(b)(2)(A)&(B)).
227. The bill adds the requirement that husband and wife "not be members of the
same household" at the time the alimony payment is made. Parties sharing the same
residence are not treated as sharing a household if one party is preparing to move out. H.
R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 195 (1983). This codifies the holding in Sydnes v.
Commissioner, 577 F.2d 60, 63 (8th Cir. 1978) and also overturns the Tax Court holding
in other circuits. See, e.g., Hertsch v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 703 (1982); Wash-
ington v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 601 (1981). See also Lyddan v. United States, 82-1 U.S.
TAX CAS. CCH V 9169 (1981), afl'd, 721 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1983). See Treas. Reg. § 1.71-
1(b)(3) (1960) (requires parties to be "separated and living apart"). Cf. Bruch, The
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wise qualifying as alimony as nontaxable. 2 s The intent of the
bill is generally to treat cash payments as alimony and property
transfers as nontaxable. Congress treats "the liability to make
any payment for any period following the death" 2 9 of the recipi-
ent as if it were able to isolate this liability as the single trait of
a property settlement which only occurs in conjunction with
ownership rights, but does not also occur in conjunction with
support rights. Thus, a federal definition, independent of state
property rights, is attempted.23 0 However, either state law or an
agreement necessarily must determine the extent of the liability
under the decree to make payment following death.
5. Recapture of Alimony Deduction
Under the bill, what is a property settlement under the
state law and current tax law may be reclassified as alimony.2 31
A one-time lump sum payment is partially deductible as ali-
mony. A payment of a principle sum spread evenly over three
years is fully deductible. The bill provides a formula for recap-
ture of part of the lump sum payment. 32 Under the bill, if "ali-
mony payments in the first year exceed the average payments in
the second and third year by more than $15,000, the excess
amounts are recaptured in the third year. 233 The payor in such
case is required to include the excess in income in the third year.
The recipient, who previously included the alimony in income, is
Effect of Informal Marital Separations on Personal Income Taxation, THE TAX ADVI-
SOR 470 (Aug. 1978).
228. H.R. 4170, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) § 423(a) (adds I.R.C. § 71(b)(1)(B)).
229. H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 195 (1983).
230. See id. at 194 (a uniform federal standard should determine alimony).
231. But see id. at 195 (recapture intended to prevent taxing one-time property set-
tlement as alimony). The provision that the exchange of property rights for cash be
taxed as alimony is confusing. Converting a property settlement under state law into
alimony for federal tax purposes goes against the current trend in state matrimonial and
divorce law, and the expectations of most married people that property acquired during
the marriage is "ours." UNIF. MAR. PROP. AcT, prefatory note at 9 (1983). This expecta-
tion may no longer be an "evanescent hope" but a "reality as a result of provisions of the
Uniform Marital Property Act giving spouses a present vested ownership right which
each has in all property acquired by the personal efforts of either during the marriage."
Id. If the uniform act, adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws in July 1983, becomes widely adopted by the states, the distinction
between cash and property as an indicia of alimony and property settlement, respec-
tively, will become misleading to the spouse exchanging vested property rights for cash.
Under the bill, the effect would be that the cash payment may be taxed as alimony.
232. H.R. 4170, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 423(a) (1983) (adds I.R.C. § 71(0).
233. H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 195 (1983).
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permitted to deduct a like amount.14  A slightly different
formula applies to excess amounts paid in the second year.
Recapture applies to the payments in the second year which
exceed the payments in the third year by more than $15,000.235
Returning to the property settlement where Becky trans-
ferred her interest in X Co. (basis $10,000, fair market value
$100,000) to Sammy for $100,000 cash, neither Sammy nor
Becky recognize a gain under the bill. However, the cash pay-
ment may qualify as alimony. If Becky's right to payment ends
at her death, under state law, or by agreement between the par-
ties, the lump sum payment will be treated as alimony.2 6 As a
result, she cannot deduct her basis in the property transferred.
The payment is not eligible for capital gains rates.2 37 Sammy
receives a $100,000 deduction in year one. If no further pay-
ments are made in years two and three, Sammy must recapture
the excess alimony deduction. Hence, in year three, Sammy
must report his excess deduction taken in year one. Under the
rule, $85,000 is included in Sammy's income and deductible
from Becky's income. If the payments instead consisted of
$50,000 paid in year one, $20,000 paid in year two, and nothing
paid in year three, recapture for the second year is $5,000
($20,000 minus $15,000) plus $27,500 for year one ($50,000
minus $15,000 minus $7,500). The $7,500 is the average pay-
ments in years two and three after reducing the payments by
234. H.R. 4170, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 423(a) (1983) (adds I.R.C. § 71(f)(1)(B)).
235. Id. at § 423(a) (adds I.R.C. § 71(f)(4)).
236. In this example, it is assumed that the parties are separated and that the trans-
fer is pursuant to a divorce decree. Presumably an exchange of community property
rights for cash would not fit within the definition of alimony because such rights are
descendible. It is not clear whether the couple can agree to change the character of the
payment to alimony by limiting the payment to the life of the recipient. See Bolza v.
Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1138 (1981) (property settlement payments not deduct-
ible though made contingent on wife's remarriage). The payor risks an attack on the
deductibility of the payment which is alimony only in form. Cf. Gregory v. Helvering,
293 U.S. 465 (1935). However, the recipient or his heirs have little risk. "Amounts paya-
ble under a life insurance contract on the life of the payee spouse will not be treated as a
liability which would affect the status" of alimony payments. H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 195 (1983). Since the right to support and property are intertwined in
the law of most states, at least some portion of a cash payment may reasonably be allo-
cated to alimony. See Beard v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1275 (1981). The bill's intent to do
away with the case-by-case determination of whether a payment is alimony or property
settlement is consistent with the purpose of the bill.
237. If the property in this example had depreciated in value, Becky would not be
able to recognize a loss on her investment. In addition, her return would be taxed as
ordinary income. See I.R.C. § 267 (1982). Cf. Siewert v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 326
(1979).
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$5,000 recaptured from the second year.238 Hence, the use of a
partial alimony deduction for a lump sum payment may reduce
Sammy's tax burden. Of course, the price for Sammy's tax relief
is paid by Becky. The recapture provision introduces additional
complexity to the tax treatment of alimony payments.2 39
VI. CHILD SUPPORT: SPOUSE WARS RETURN
Once it is determined that a transfer incident to divorce is
either a property settlement or alimony, the couple's tax
problems have only just begun. As divorced parents, Sammy and
Becky will have continuing tax problems.
A. The Lester Principle
Assume Becky has physical custody of the children and
Sammy contributes to their support.2 40 For Becky, the primary
question is whether the support payments are included in her
income. For Sammy, it is whether the payments are deductible.
The indirect and chameleon-like determination of tax conse-
238. H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 196 (1983). Recapture is not required
if either party dies or recipient remarries during the three-year period. H.R. 4170, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 423(a) (1983) (adds I.R.C. § 71(f)(5)(A)); cf. Rev. Rul. 82-155, 1982-2
C.B. 36. Payments after remarriage of former spouse generally are not deductible by
payor as alimony. Differences in state law determine whether payor is legally obligated to
pay alimony after recipient's remarriage. See Schaer v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH)
1191 (1979) (Pennsylvania law). Alimony payments subsequent to recipient's remarriage
are often reclassified as child support. See, e.g., Henry v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M.
(CCH) 124 (1982). But see Blakey v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 963 (1982) (alimony pay-
ments pursuant to written agreement not contingent on remarriage) (Virginia law). The
Commissioner's position is that payments after recipient's remarriage are income to
recipient as a windfall under I.R.C. § 61, but are not deductible by payor under I.R.C. §
215 (1982). Rev. Rul. 82-155, 1982-2 C.B. 36 (supersedes Rev. Rul. 81-8, 1981-1 C.B. 42).
But see Colucci v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 499 (1980). Prepayment of alimony
prior to the recipient's remarriage normally results in denial of a deduction for the
amount paid in excess of monthly installments fixed by the decree of separation. Moore
v. United States, 449 F. Supp. 163 (N.D. Tex. 1978). Accord Sechrest v. United States,
490 F.2d 102 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 826 (1974); Van Vlaanderen v. Commis-
sioner, 175 F.2d 389 (3d Cir. 1949); Blanchard v. United States, 424 F. Supp. 916 (D. Md.
1976).
239. The complex provisions concerning recapture cause bunching of income in the
year of receipt and are contrary to the bill's aim of simplifying the tax provisions con-
cerning divorce.
240. The bill addresses the relatively minor, but often litigated issue of the depen-
dency exemption. The bill changes the rules for the exemption in two ways. First, gener-
ally, the exemption itself goes to the custodial parent unless waived. Second, the bill
separates the dependency exemption from the medical expense deduction in the case of
children of divorced parents. See supra note 155.
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quences of the various interpretations of the word "alimony" has
its effect upon child support as defined by the federal tax law.
The tax principles governing child support payments can be
stated simply. Child support is neither gross income to the
recipient24" ' nor deductible by the payor.242 It has the status of a
nontaxable transfer. Consider a separation agreement similar to
that construed by the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Les-
ter.243 Sammy pays a total of $600 per month toward the sup-
port of Becky and their three children. However, as each of the
three children cease to be dependent, the payment is reduced by
one-sixth of the amount, $100. Here, Becky understands that
the payment is 50 % alimony and 50 % child support. But the
tax consequences are not apportioned as $300 alimony and $300
child support. Sammy's total payment of $600 is alimony.2 14
Although simple arithmetic could establish how much of the
payment is child support, the Supreme Court held in Lester that
such wording is insufficient to fix "any specific amount or por-
tion" of the payments as child support.2 5 The trick is to deter-
mine whether a given payment falls within the category of child
support246
Under the Lester principle, a payment combining support
for both the wife and the children is classified as alimony247
241. I.R.C. § 71(b) (1982). An amount of money or a part of the payment fixed as
child support by the terms of the divorce decree or agreement is not alimony income to
the recipient. Id. See also I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(8), 682(a) (1982) (child support payments from
trust not income to the recipient).
242. Payments to former spouse are deductible only if included in recipient's
income under I.R.C. § 71 (1982). See I.R.C. § 215 (1982). In the case of part payment of
alimony and child support, funds are first applied to child support. I.R.C. § 71(b) (1982).
For example, Sammy is required by a divorce decree to pay Becky $12,000 per year in
alimony and $12,000 per year in child support. Sammy pays $15,000 in 1983. Only the
$3,000 paid in excess of child support is deductible as alimony. If Sammy paid $11,000 in
1983, the full amount is allocated to child support and nothing is deductible as alimony.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(e) (1960). See also Ross v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 488
(1972).
243. 366 U.S. 299 (1961).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 300.
246. The Lester language implies that wives, such as Becky, are taxed on their
receipt of support as alimony because the money is subject to their "unfettered com-
mand." Lester, 366 U.S. at 303. This language is deceptive, however, because no case
indicates that Becky must account for child support, see Maytag v. Commissioner, 370
F.2d 914 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1034 (1967), or use the payments for the
children. Id. Becky must neither prove nor itemize any expenditures on behalf of the
children. Id.
247. Lester, 366 U.S. 299. Indirect payments such as medical insurance coverage for
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Child support is not to be inferred from the language of the
decree.2 " For example, a decree stating that the purpose of the
payment to Becky is to take care of the children2 49 does not
transform alimony into child support. Nor does the fact that the
entire sum is spent on the children fix the payment as child sup-
port.2 50 The words required by Lester to isolate alimony or child
support with their respective consequent tax status are words of
designation, not obligation.25 1 A willful shift in the ordinary tax
liabilities of support payments from Becky back to Sammy is
required.2 2 The rule is not neutral between the parties to the
divorce. Where the parties do not have tax advice or the agree-
ment is poorly drafted, the Lester rule tends to place tax liabil-
ity on the custodial parent.2" Even in states such as Washington
which have adopted minimum child support guidelines,254 the
both wife and children will be treated as alimony unless the amount of the children's
coverage is separately stated. Thus, a single premium paid for coverage of wife and chil-dren is taxed as alimony, not child support. Levine v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH)
531 (1967).
248. Lester, 366 U.S. at 303.
249. Taylor v. Taylor, 349 F. Supp. 123, 124 (W.D. Va. 1972) (mere intent not
sufficient).
250. Hummel v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 1131 (1957). But see Sperling v. Commis-
sioner, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 193 (1982), afl'd, 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9176 (2d Cir.1984) (children's college expenses paid pursuant to separation agreement not alimony).
251. Once the boundary line separating alimony from child support is crossed, child
support payments do not become alimony by the fact that Becky puts all her child sup-
port payments in the bank. Nor are they changed by the fact that Becky is not legallyobligated to spend the money on the children, West v. United States, 413 F.2d 294, 295(4th Cir. 1969), or by the fact that the child for whom support has been fixed is over 18and not legally a minor. Borbonus v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 983 (1964) (minor defined as
one under 21).
252. The pitfalls of the Lester case can be avoided with careful drafting of the
divorce decree or separation agreement. The use of different paragraphs and subtitlesclearly distinguishes child support from alimony provisions. The net cost of child sup-port depends upon the taxable income of the payor. See infra notes 257-59 and accom-
panying text.
253. Various studies report that approximately 90% of children of divorced parentslive with their mother. See, e.g., Bruch, Developing Standards for Child Support Pay-
ments: A Critique of Current Practice, 16 U.C.D. L. REv. 49, 53 n.17 (1982). Thedivorced woman experiences a greater economic decline than the divorced man. Studies
of families with young children showed mothers experienced very rapid economicdecline. For couples married less than 10 years and having a low per capita income level(less than $20,000 per year), the husband's post-divorce income was twice that of hiswife. At higher income levels (over $40,000), the husband had 200% of his pre-divorce
income, while the wife had only 48%. Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and
Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 1181, 1244 (1981); cf. id. at 1239, 1248.
254. Family Law Section of Seattle King County Bar Association, New Child Sup-
port Schedule Dissolved Marriages, SEATrLE KING CourTY BA BULL. 1 (Dec. 1974) p.1 .
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wording of the decree may fall within the holding of Lester and
be taxed as alimony. 5 The support ordered by the state court is
thereby indirectly modified by an unexpected shift of the tax
burden.2"6 The federal court deciding the tax issue does not have
jurisdiction to restructure the divorce decree.
The basis for the Lester policy is the belief that Sammy's
ability to shift that tax burden to Becky will benefit the former
family group by a correlative increase in tax deductible support
payments. In theory, Sammy reduces his taxable income by
shifting the tax burden for child support to Becky. In the ideal
example, Becky's tax bracket is increased and Sammy's is
decreased until a point of equilibrium is reached.5 7 The total
tax calculated by combining the tax liability of high and low
bracket taxpayers is higher than combining the tax liability of
two middle range taxpayers.2 5 8
The fallacy of the Lester principle is in the combination.
Sammy and Becky are no longer an economic unit. The shift in
the tax consequences to Becky means Becky pays more tax while
Sammy pays less.2  Sammy may be content to pay tax on his
255. Stevens v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 220 (1982), affd, 709 F.2d 12 (5th
Cir. 1983).
256. Cf. Newman v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 219 (1974) (wife's alimony
reduced on basis that it was not taxable income).
257. Sammy and Becky are divorced parents with taxable incomes of $50,000 and
$10,000 respectively. Sammy files as a single taxpayer and Becky files as head of house-
hold. If Sammy pays Becky $20,000 in alimony, each has taxable income of $30,000.
Sammy and Becky pay tax of $6,486 and $5,951, respectively, or a combined tax of
$12,437. The tax is not equal because the filing status of the custodial parent as head of
household has a lower rate than the status of the noncustodial parent filing as a single
taxpayer. See Blumenthal v. Commissioner, [Current Memo Decisions] TAx CT. REP.
(CCH) Dec. 40,662(m) (1983). In this example the spread between the lowest and highest
marginal rates is so great that in order to achieve equilibrium an inordinate sum would
have to change hands. See Weitzman, supra note 253, at 1243, 1249. Where the spouses
have comparable income, there is no tax advantage overall in the use of alimony to shift
income between former spouses.
258. Sammy and Becky are divorced parents with taxable incomes of $50,000 and
$10,000 respectively. Sammy files as a single taxpayer and Becky files as head of house-
hold. Sammy pays a tax of $14,738. Becky pays a tax of $1,073. The combined tax is
$15,811. The tax liability of this combination of high and low income bracket taxpayers
exceeds the combination of middle range taxpayers in the example above by $3,374. See
supra note 195.
259. Sammy's taxable income is $50,000 and Becky's taxable income is $10,000.
Sammy pays Becky $10,000. If the transfer is labeled alimony, Sammy's income is
reduced to $40,000. Sammy's tax on $40,000 is $10,323. This is $4,415 less than if his
income remained at $50,000 ($14,738). His net cost is $5,585 ($10,000 transfer less $4,415
tax saving). This transfer also causes Becky's income to increase to $20,000. Her tax on
$20,000 is $3,128. This represents an increase in tax of $2,055 over the amount of tax
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high income and give Becky the minimum amount of support.6 0
B. The Lester Principle-A Faded Line
I.R.C. section 71(b)2 '1 has been interpreted as an election
between taxable and nontaxable support payments. "2 Since the
election is not made directly, often the tax consequences of the
payment are not those intended. The Lester principle is difficult
to apply because the mechanical construction in favor of ali-
mony thwarts the taxpayers' common sense expectation. Where
a sum is not sufficiently identified as child support, parol evi-
dence is not permitted to show the intent to designate the pay-
ment as child support. 3 In turn, a divorce decree that does not
pass the Lester requirements in federal court often leads to
renewed state court litigation to amend the decree. In the case
of a mistake, a nunc pro tunc order in state court can apportion
child support retroactively2 6 4 or prospectively. 65 This solution
requires unnecessary and costly litigation at the state level.
Some lower courts have softened the Lester principle where
circumstances include a conscious delineation between alimony
and child support. For example, although the sentence, "The
sum shall be reduced by $7,000 as each child reaches majority"
does not fix an amount of child support, 6 the mere addition of
paid on $10,000 ($1,073). Her net receipt is $7,945 ($10,000 transfer less $2,055 tax
increase). If the same payment is labeled child support, neither Sammy's nor Becky's
income is changed by the transfer. The cost to Sammy is the $10,000 transfer plus $4,415
in tax. Becky nets the full $10,000.
260. In practice, child support awards rarely meet a child's minimal needs or assure
the child a standard of living comparable to that of the noncustodial parent. Bruch,
supra note 253, at 50.
261. I.R.C. § 71(b) (1982).
262. The "Private Ordering" Concept, supra note 80, at 6.
263. Metcalf v. Commissioner, 343 F.2d 66, 67-68 (1st Cir. 1965); see also Newman
v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1522, 1523-24 (1981); Cothman v. Commissioner, 57
T.C. 296, 300-01 (1971). But see Westreich v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1563,
1565 (1977); Cohen v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1559, 1562 (1977) (companion
cases); Johnson v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 530, 532-33 (1966) (parol evidence fixed child
support where decree failed Lester test).
264. See, e.g., Muss v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 758, 760 (1970) (amended
order conformed to judge's original intent). Retroactivity for tax purposes is generally
limited to clerical errors. See Johnson v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 530, 532-33 (1966); Rev.
Rul. 71-416, 1971-2 C.B. 83.
265. Graham v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 415, 423 (1982); Gordon v. Commissioner, 70
T.C. 525, 533 (1978) (retroactive change in legal status of payments not given retroactive
effect for tax purposes); Rev. Rul. 58-52, 1958-1 C.B. 29.
266. See Lester, 376 U.S. at 300. See also Rev. Proc. 82-53, 1982-2 C.B. 842 (forms
for taxable or nontaxable support payments).
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the words "for tax purpose' '126 or "wife undertakes to expend at
least $30 per week of the alimony for the benefit of the chil-
dren e2 or "binding the estate of husband to the extent of
$4,000 for the benefit of the children '269 has been held to fix
such amounts as child support. The cumulative result is that
these lower court decisions overrun the supposedly clear distinc-
tion between taxable or nontaxable payments posed by the Les-
ter case as if it were the Maginot Line.
C. Reforming Alimony and Child Support Taxation
The Task Force proposals would change the choice of names
to "includible/deductible" (alimony) and "nonincludible/nonde-
ductible" (child support) .270 For couples reaching an agreement,
any amount chosen, whether characterized as child support or
alimony under current law, could be designated as includible
income to the recipient and deductible by the payor.2 7 1 For
example, by written agreement, Sammy pays Becky $1,000 per
month, 40% to be specified as includible/deductible, 60% nonin-
cludible/nondeductible. Under the proposal, the allocation of
income tax would bind the parties and the Government.272
Where the parties do not choose the private ordering rules, the
current rules under I.R.C. section 71(b) and the Lester case will
continue as "fall back rules. '273 Although the private ordering
proposal should end much of the litigation, the fall back rules
will perpetuate the problems with applying Lester.
The Task Force proposal to change the terminology from
"alimony" and "child support" to "deductible" and "nondeduct-
ible," though a great leap forward, does not answer certain ques-
tions. If deductible payments are elected, does the election con-
tinue as long as payments are made, or will certain contingencies
cause the deduction to end? A similar problem results under the
bill. Under both proposals, alimony treatment is no longer predi-
cated upon the payment being pursuant to a legal obligation to
267. Abramno v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 154, 157 (1982).
268. West v. United States, 413 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1969).
269. Commissioner v. Gotthelf, 407 F.2d 491, 493 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
828 (1969).
270. Technical Memorandum, supra note 81, at 12.
271. Id.
272. See The "Private Ordering" Concept, supra note 80, at 2-5.
273. Technical Memorandum, supra note 81, at 19.
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support the former spouse.274 Hence, it is unclear whether the
right to a deduction will end in the case of remarriage of the
recipient.
Consider that Sammy and Becky agree that 80% of the
$1,000 per month that Sammy pays to Becky will be taxed as
alimony. The payment will be for fifteen years. Their youngest
child is six. Becky remarries and Sammy continues to pay the
$1,000 to support the children. Will Sammy's payment continue
to be deductible? The current federal tax law follows the usual
state law practice of ending alimony rights at remarriage. In
such case payments after remarriage are not pursuant to the
requisite legal obligation and hence not deductible as alimony.
Therefore, Sammy loses his $800 deduction upon remarriage
unless state law will enforce an agreement to pay alimony after
the recipient's remarriage. The concept of alimony under state
family law, based on support rights, does not relate to the bill's
definition of alimony under the federal tax law (cash payments
contingent upon recipient's death). Therefore, under the bill, the
answer to whether Sammy may shift the tax incidence of sup-
port payments to Becky can no longer be answered by reference
to state law. However, the language of both the bill and the
Task Force proposal support a continuing deduction for
Sammy.27a If the alimony deduction continues after Becky's
274. H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 195 (1983).
275. Under current law, this question is answered by reference to state law. Where
state law terminates support rights upon the recipient's remarriage, purported alimony
payments made after the former spouse's remarriage generally are not deductible. See
Hoffman v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1607, 1611 (1970), aff'd per curiam, 455 F.2d 161 (7th
Cir. 1972); Cohen v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1559, 1562 (1977); Joss v. Commis-
sioner, 56 T.C. 378, 384 (1971); Brown v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 865, 871 (1968), aff'd per
curiam, 415 F.2d 310 (4th Cir. 1969); Rev. Rul. 82-155, 1982-2 C.B. 36, 37 (amplifying
and superceding Rev. Rul. 81-8, 1981-1 C.B. 42). Nevertheless, payments may be income
to the recipient unless excluded by another section of the Code. Id. at 37. In the minority
of states where the recipient's remarriage does not affect alimony rights under state law,
the tax status of the payment as alimony does not change. Hayutin v. Commissioner, 508
F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1974) (payments extended over more than 10-year period); Guiberson
v. United States, 43 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 79-352 (D. Kan. 1978) (payments under the
decree did not end on remarriage absent a provision in the settlement, alimony termi-
nated only on death of husband under state law). Two rules have developed with respect
to the tax status of alimony payments that serve as support for children as well as for
the former wife and which are to continue after the wife's remarriage. One rule is that
alimony is reclassified as child support when the wife in fact remarries. The other rule is
that alimony payments continue despite remarriage. Henry v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M.
(CCH) 124, 127 (1982) (payments after former spouse's remarriage reclassified as child
support under Georgia law); Westreich v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1563 (1977);
Toole v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1304 (1974); see Wilson v. Commissioner, 49
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remarriage, Sammy, as a divorced, noncustodial father, will be in
a better tax position after the divorce than before the divorce
when contributions to child support were not deductible .2 7 This
is poor tax policy.
At a time when child support payments tend to be based on
minimum standards, the Lester principle places the tax burden
on the former spouse with the lower standard of living without
compensating for the tax cost of the payment. If this happens,
there is less support for the child. The Lester principle is not in
reality a source of flexibility for the taxpayer. The divorcing
couple should have a direct and informed choice regarding which
of them bears the tax burden of child support.2 7 7 The Lester
principle has sired the practice of overreaching by the party with
tax advice against the custodial parent. "Accordingly the prac-
tice of 'Lesterizing' child-support payments-i.e., 'burying' them
under spousal support labels solely for tax purposes-is
extremely common today. '27 8 Congress should not ratify this
subterfuge.
The sources used by the Task Force include the 1942 testi-
mony of Randolph Paul279 that in some cases the "entire
income" of the husband was absorbed by taxes and alimony.
Paul added, "At the same time, divorced wives receiving tax free
alimony possess a privileged status under our tax laws which
relieves them of any share of the tax burden. ' 280 This view is
hardly in accord with current studies of the standard of living of
divorced women and their children.
VII. CONCLUSION
There are two questions associated with the taxation of
property divisions. The first is how to limit the impact of the
federal tax law on state-created marital rights. The second is
T.C. 1 (1967); see also Engelhardt v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 641 (1972). Before the
remarriage the requirement that payments continue upon remarriage does not affect ali-
mony treatment. Isaacson v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 658 (1972).
276. Becky's status as a remarried recipient of alimony will allow her to file a joint
return with her second husband, and also allow her first husband to continue to split his
income with her. This is a departure from the classic doctrine against assignment of
income. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
277. Compare I.R.C. § 215 (1982) (alimony deduction) with I.R.C. § 44a (1982)
(child care credit).
278. The "Private Ordering" Concept, supra note 80, at 6.
279. The "Private Ordering" Concept, supra note 80, Exhibit B, Item 1.
280. Id.
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how to achieve equity in the division of property and support
obligations between the former spouses. Congress and the ABA
Task Force answer these questions with markedly different
approaches. The author summarizes these approaches in the
charts following this article.
The economic apportionment of property is determined
ordinarily by private agreement sanctioned by the state divorce
court. In amending the Code sections taxing divorce-related
transfers, Congress should weigh the impact that the federal tax
law reapportionment of the division has on the legitimate inter-
ests of the state government and the divorced taxpayer. If the
goal of the legislative reform is to produce uniform tax results
despite differences in state law, a unified federal system seems
to be the way to achieve it. On the other hand, such a standard
may not be attainable under a federal system. If it were, the
question becomes whether the federal government, through the
tax law, should control property settlement.
Establishing a body of substantive law for federal courts inmatters not otherwise of federal concern is not a legitimate end
within the scope of the constitution; thus, to frustrate the abil-
ity of the states to make their laws fully effective in areas gen-
erally reserved to them would be inconsistent with the consti-
tutional plan.281
In practice, the second question is answered in the negotia-
tion process determining the property settlement agreement.
Ninety percent 282 of domestic relations cases are settled by
agreement rather than by court decree. The only aspect of the
divorce that cannot be settled by agreement is the apportion-
ment of the tax burden between the former spouses. The private
ordering concept of the Task Force proposal is a fair and
rational way to determine tax disputes.
Making the parties take tax positions consistent with their
agreement is good policy. The policy should be expanded to
make apportionment of tax consequences by the divorce decree
binding in the same manner as private ordering agreements.
Without private ordering, the economics of a divorce settlement
281. Friendly, In Praise of Erie and the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 383, 397 (1964).
282. The "Private Ordering" Concept, supra note 80, at 9 (citing Mnookin & Korn-
hauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L. J. 950,
951 n.3 (1979) (less than 10% of divorces are contested)).
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cannot be fully certain. The direct election of tax results by the
former spouses prevents the mechanical rules, initiated as safe
harbors, from applying in an arbitrary way. 8s
Sammy and Becky deserve fewer, not more troubles, as they
endure the stress of their divorce. It is unworthy of the federal
government to permit the quarrel that ended in the divorce
court to be revived in a tax proceeding forum.
[EDITOR'S NOTE: At the time of publication, H.R. 4170 (now
the Tax Reform Act of 1984) was amended and approved by the
House Ways and Means Committee and is now pending before
Congress.]
283. Reform of the taxation of property transfers incident to divorce should include
the following measures: (1) permit direct election of tax consequences of property divi-
sion whereby the parties can choose either a nontaxable property division with a carry-
over basis or a taxable property division with a stepped-up basis, see supra notes 158-60
and accompanying text; (2) permit nontaxable cash transfers to facilitate equal property
divisions, see supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text; (3) adopt different basis rules
consistent with either an in-kind division of property or an exchange of separate prop-
erty, see supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text; and, (4) limit the tax-free transfer
of property subject to liability in excess of basis, see supra note 185 and accompanying
text.
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